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Introduction
Late Friday morning, the Assistant Clerk for Merits Briefing walked briskly
down the white marble side-corridors, away from the tourists and school
groups, to return to her mahogany desk in the windowless ground-floor
anteroom to the Clerk's Offices in the U.S. Supreme Court building. Taking
the list of decisions on the petitions considered during that morning's
Conference, her immediate task was to ensure that the various orders were
properly entered into the Court's electronic systems. On Monday morning,
November 29, 1999, one of those orders would announce that the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts's petition for a writ of certiorari in the
"Burma law" case, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, was granted.'
* © Peter L. Fitzgerald, Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of
Law. B.A. 1973, William and Mary; J.D. 1976, University of California Hastings College
of Law; LL.M. (European Legal Studies), University of Exeter, United Kingdom. Prior to
joining the Stetson faculty, Professor Fitzgerald was a member of the IBM Legal
Department and law clerk to the Honorable Patrick E. Higginbotham, U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Texas.
1. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
68 U.S.L.W. 3353 (U.S. Nov. 29, 1999) (No. 99-474). Stephen P. Crosby replaced
Andrew S. Natsios as the Secretary of Administration and Finance of the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts by the time the Supreme Court rendered its opinion. Natsios
had replaced Charles D. Baker, the original defendant when the case was filed in 1998.
See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998), affd sub
nom. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999), affid sub nom.
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
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That same weekend, Simon Billenness was preparing for "The Battle in
Seattle. ' 2 The Free Burma Coalition, in which he was a key figure, was part
of an unusual gathering of diverse groups planning to protest the negative
effects of international trade and globalization during four days of meet-
ings by the World Trade Organization (WTO) beginning on November 30.3
Joining with anarchists, environmentalists, union members, and other
activist organizations, these groups would seriously disrupt the Seattle
meetings 4 and do the same the following year to the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) meetings in both Washington, D.C.,5 and Prague, 6 as well
as the European Union summit in Nice.7 The Seattle protests would
become famous for the dichotomy embodied in images of environmental-
ists in sea-turtle costumes and unionists exchanging chants of "Turtles
Love Teamsters" and "Teamsters Love Turtles," while masked anarchists
vandalized Seattle's stores.8 Billenness's involvement with both the global-
ization concerns and the Massachusetts case went back many years.
Seven years ago, Billenness, an analyst for an asset management firm
specializing in socially responsible investments, attended a conference
marking the end to the boycott of companies doing business in South
Africa,9 following the demise of apartheid. 10 Upon meeting Massachusetts
Representative Byron Rushing, Billenness asked whether the state legislator
would be interested in a new sanctions target, Burma." Although Rushing
initially did not know much about events in Burma, Billenness persuaded
Rushing to adapt the Massachusetts anti-apartheid legislation to address
Burma, literally substituting one country's name for the other in a new
bill. 12 The bill became law two years later, in 1996.13 It was the constitu-
2. David Postman, Everyone has an Agenda Including the Turtles, SEArIE TIMES, Nov.
28, 1999, at El, LEXIS, News Library, SEATTM File.
3. Id.
4. See generally Richard Lacayo, Rage Against the Machine: Despite, and Because of,
Violence, Anti-WTO Protestors were Heard, TIME, Dec. 13, 1999, at 34.
5. See Patrice Hill, IMF, World Bank Targets Again, WAsH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2000, at
C1, C6; see also infra notes 369-78 and accompanying text.
6. Walden Bello, 2000: The Year of Global Protest Against Globalization, BUSINESS-
WORLD (Manila), Dec. 26, 2000, (Perspective), at 1, LEXIS, News Library, BWORLD File.
7. John-Thor Dahlburg, Protestors Besiege the Opening of a Crucial EU Summit, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A17; European Union Leaders Reach Pact: Overhaul Agreement
Clears Way for Expansion of Bloc, Cm. TIB., Dec. 11, 2000, at M5 [hereinafter European
Union Leaders Reach Pact]; Andrew Nagorski, Time to Put Up or Shut Up, NEWSWEEK,
Dec. 18, 2000, at 4.
8. William Greider, Global Agenda, NATION, Jan. 31, 2000, at 11.
9. The boycott against the apartheid regime in South Africa ended in 1991,
although a number of U.S. and other sanctions remained in place until 1995. See Peter L.
Fitzgerald, Pierre Goes Online: Blacklisting and Secondary Boycotts in U.S. Trade Policy, 31
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 18 n.71 (1998).
10. Steven Mufson, High Court Considers Mass. Anti-Burma Law, WASH. POST, Mar.
23, 2000, at A2.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. An Act Regulating State Contracts with Companies Doing Business with or in
Burma (Myanmar), 1996 Mass. Acts ch. 130 (codified at MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 7, §§ 22G-
M (2000)).
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tionality of this bill that was at issue in the National Foreign Trade Council
case.
Thus, at the same time the Free Burma Coalition and other organiza-
tions took to the streets demanding greater accountability from interna-
tional institutions, such as the WTO and the IMF, and the end of an "era of
trade negotiations conducted by sheltered elites balancing competing com-
mercial interests behind closed doors," 14 the Supreme Court began wres-
ding with a similar problem of balancing governmental and popular
interests. In trying to determine whether the Massachusetts Burma Law
was such an irritant to foreign relations that it impinged upon the federal
government's foreign affairs powers or whether the state was simply exer-
cising its rights to chose how to spend its citizens' tax revenues in the mar-
ketplace, the Court, like the WTO and the IMF, grappled with a new
balance between governmental interest and democracy-a new federalism
in a global era. As the Chair of the AFL-CIO International Affairs Commit-
tee declared in the wake of the Seattle protests, "Globalization has reached
a turning point. The future is a contested terrain of very public choices that
will shape the world economy of the 21st century."1 5
The new communication technologies embodied in the Internet are
fueling the globalization of the world economy. The marketing hyperbole
associated with the "global village" is now commonplace, as exemplified by
IBM's long-running "Solutions for a Small Planet" advertising campaign.
From meditating Tibetan Monks spiritually communicating about the pos-
sibility of collaborating over computer networks, ecologists lost in the rain
forests of Brazil using a laptop to find their way, ordinary Greek fishermen
dreaming of expanding their business with online sales, or a small Texas
company using the Internet to win a contract supplying parts to a Japanese
multinational to the feel-good message of the "I am A Superman, I Can Do
Anything" software ads, the message is one of individual empowerment in
a marketplace that transcends national boundaries. 16 Other examples of
the seductive power of the Internet are everywhere; virtually no one in the
business world is unaffected by the "e-revolution."
Ironically, the same tools that create these worldwide opportunities for
businesses are also revitalizing an old strain of anti-corporate and anti-colo-
nial sentiment while providing the ability to present these concerns in new
ways. For example, as Naomi Klein wrote in her book, No Logo: Taking Aim
at the Brand Bullies:
More and more.., we in the West have been catching glimpses of another
kind of global village, where the economic divide is widening and cultural
choices narrowing.
14. Jay Mazur, Labor's New Internationalism, FoRHGN Aim., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 79.
15. Id.
16. IBM, IBM Solutions for a Small Planet at http://wwv.ibm.com/sfasp (last visited
May 22, 2000); AdCritic.com, IBM - Domo Arigato Ad, at http://www.adcritic.com/con-
tent/ibm-e-commerce-domo-arigato.html (last visited May 22, 2000); AdCritic.com, IBM
I am Superman Ad, at http://www.adcritic.com/content/ibm-lotus-domino-i-am-super-
man.html (last visited May 22, 2000).
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This is a village where some multinationals, far from leveling the global
playing field with jobs and technology for all, are in the process of mining
the planet's poorest back country for unimaginable profits. This is the village
where Bill Gates lives, amassing a fortune of $55 billion while a third of his
workforce is classified as temporary workers .... This is the village where
we are indeed connected to one another through a web of [various vendor's]
brands, but the underside of that web reveals designer slums like the one I
visited outside Jakarta. IBM claims that its technology spans the globe, and
so it does, but often its international presence takes the form of cheap Third
World labor producing the computer chips and power sources that drive our
machines. On the outskirts of Manila, for instance, I met a seventeen-year-
old girl who assembles CD-ROM drives for IBM. I told her I was impressed
that someone so young could do such high-tech work. "We make com-
puters," she told me, "but we don't know how to operate computers."
Ours ... is not such a small planet after all.17
The protests in Seattle highlighted this other view of globalization,
which harkens back to the old debate between the "win-lose" view of
trade-the notion that "First World" wealth is obtained at the expense of
the "Third World"-as opposed to the "win-win" view of trade embodied in
the theory of comparative advantage.' 8 The protests addressed a number of
different issues, going well beyond human rights in Burma to encompass
concerns ranging from the environment to labor issues. While pervasive
distrust of corporate power and regulatory institutions in the global mar-
ketplace is a common and familiar theme, the extensive use of the Internet
to mobilize and communicate the protesters' positions on the "contested
terrain of very public choices" is entirely new.19 The Burma example illus-
trates how the power of the Internet gives these popular concerns new cur-
rency in the marketplace, consequently requiring adjustments in how
governmental institutions respond to the issues.
I. Massachusetts Burma Law and Internet Advocacy
A. Legal Background
Massachusetts enacted the "Burma Law" in 1996 in response to Myanmar's
military government20 refusing to recognize the results of democratic elec-
tions held in 1990 and engaging in an ongoing pattern of human rights
17. NAoMI KLEIN, No LOGO: TAKING AIM AT THE BRAND BULLIES, at xvii (1999).
18. The economic theory of comparative advantage is that trade is mutually profita-
ble even when one country is more productive than the other in every commodity
exchanged. It is traced to the nineteenth-century economist David Ricardo and his the-
ory of "value," which considers how each country gains when it specializes in trade of
goods where it has relatively lower costs or a "comparative advantage." If all countries
specialize in those goods, then the general level of world prosperity increases. See gener-
ally DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY & TAXATION (3d ed. 1821),
available at McMaster University, http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/
3113/ricardo/prin.
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
20. In 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), a military
junta, seized power from the military dictator who ruled Burma from 1962, General Ne
Win. After cracking down on pro-democracy demonstrators, the SLORC seized power
and renamed the country Myanmar. The SLORC renamed itself in late 1997 and is now
Vol. 34
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abuses. 2 1 A typical selective purchasing measure, the law limited the ability
of any State agency or authority, or the legislature, to purchase goods or
services from persons or entities identified on a "restricted purchase list"
due to their connections with Burma.2 2 The statute called for adding ten
percent to the price bid by those businesses on the restricted list when
evaluating the lowest bidder in a given procurement. 23 The law only
exempted contracts for medical supplies 24 or contracts where the process
eliminated an "essential" bid or offer.2 5 The law otherwise applied equally
to all suppliers, whether domiciled in Massachusetts or elsewhere. It did
not, however, affect dealings among private parties or prohibit private par-
ties from contracting with Burma. But failure to comply with the terms of
the Burma Law when dealing with the government in Massachusetts ren-
dered the contract void.2 6
The Massachusetts Secretary of Administration and Finance compiled
also known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The United States does
not recognize the Myanmar military regime.
Beginning in 1994, eighteen U.S. cities, one county, and one state-Massachussetts-
enacted selective purchasing laws penalizing companies doing business with Burma.
Additionally, on May 20, 1997, the U.S. Government imposed sanctions prohibiting new
investments in Burma by U.S. persons or entities. U.S. EMBASSY, RANGOON, U.S. STATE
DEP'T, COUNTRY COMMERCiAL GUIDES: FY 1999: BURMA chs. I-Ill (Sept. 1998), available at
http://ww.state.gov/wwv/about-state/business/comguides/1999/eastasia/
burma99.html.
21. The original sponsor of the Massachusetts Burma Law, State Representative
Byron Rushing, declared that the goal of the measure was "free democratic elections in
Burma." Although the law contained no specific legislative purpose, Massachusetts
stated in court that the law "expresses the Commonwealth's own disapproval of the
violations of human rights committed by the Burmese government" and "contributes to
the growing effort ... to apply indirect economic pressure against the Burma regime for
reform." Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1999), affd
sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000). According to
Amnesty International, the military regime in Burma has committed "widespread
human rights violations against ethnic minorities, including extrajudicial executions,
torture, ill-treatment during forced labour and portering, and forcible relocations."
AMNESTY INT'L, ANNUAL REPORT 1999: MYANMAR (1999), available at http://www.
amnesty.org/ailib/aireport/ar99/asal6.htm; see also EU and Japan Still Weighing Action
On Mass. Burma Procurement Penalties, 15 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 44 (Jan. 14,
1998).
22. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22H (2000). To appreciate the breadth of coverage in
these procurement restrictions, see id. § 22G for the definitions of "state agency" and
"state authority."
23. Id. §§ 22G (defining "Comparable low bid or offer"), 22H(d).
24. Id. § 221. This exemption worked both ways. Massachusetts could purchase sup-
plies for which there is "no medical substitute" from persons or entities doing business
in Burma without applying the 10% bid premium. Similarly, if a person's or entity's only
dealings with Burma were the provision of medical supplies, then they were not subject
to the 10% bid premium for state contractors. Id.
25. Id. § 22H(b). Massachusetts may procure goods or services from companies or
individuals on the Burma Restriction List if (1) a certification is supplied to the head of
the state department or agency, (2) stating that the procurement is necessary to avoid
irreparable harm to the agency's operations or mission, and (3) that compliance with
the Burma law's preferences would eliminate the only bid or otherwise result in inade-
quate competition. Id.
26. Id. § 22L.
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a "restricted purchase list,"2 7 intended to include the names of persons
"doing business" in Burma.28 The statute defined "doing business" to
include not only Burmese business entities or those with a principal place
of business in Burma but also those outside the country with "down-
stream" interests in Burma.29 These downstream interests included, for
example, Burmese majority-owned subsidiaries, franchises, distribution
agreements, leases, operations, or "similar agreements." 30 Moreover, the
majority-owned subsidiary, franchisee, or licensee of "upstream" persons
or entities that do business in Burma were within the definition's scope.3 1
The statute further included those business entities outside Burma that
simply provide goods or services to the Government of Burma or promote
the importation or sale in other countries of items controlled by the Gov-
ernment of Burma, such as gems, timber, oil, gas, or related products.3 2
Finally, the statute broadly defined the Burmese Government to include
any public or quasi-public entity on the municipal, provincial, or national
level, as well as any national corporation in which the Government had a
financial interest or for which it had operational responsibility. 33 Aug-
menting the Massachusetts list of restricted entities, the State required each
bidder on a state contract to supply a declaration or affidavit, under pen-
alty of perjury, detailing "the nature and extent to which the bidder is cur-
rently doing business with or in Burma" as defined in the statute. 3 4
Thus, Massachusetts drafted the law with a broad, sweeping reach. A
subsidiary of a Japanese company, for example, may have no dealings with
Burma or any real ability to influence its parent company's actions. How-
ever, if the parent company imported Burmese oil products into Japan, the
subsidiary would be disadvantaged in bidding on government procure-
ments in Massachusetts because of its parent's "upstream" activities. The
statutory scheme mandated this result irrespective of whether the subsidi-
ary was domiciled in Massachusetts, elsewhere in the United States, or
abroad. The roster of companies on the Burma restriction list reflected this
broad coverage. The blacklist included 44 U.S. and 281 foreign companies,
but only four of the U.S. and fifty-three of the foreign companies listed had
27. The Secretary first promulgated the Burma Restriction List on December 9,
1996. Operational Servs. Div., Commonw. of Mass., What's New, at http://www.
state.ma.us/new/new9612.htm (last modified Jan. 1, 1997). Following the District
Court's decision in National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass.
1998), affd sub nom. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999), aff'd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000), the
List was removed on November 17, 1998. Harold Fisher, Burma Statute Update, OSDis-
CUSSIONS.... Winter 1999, at 1.
28. MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 7, § 22J.
29. Id. § 22G.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. (defining the "Government of Burma (Myanmar)").
34. OPERATIONAL SERVS. Div., COMMONw. OF MASS., PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PRO-
CEDURES HANDBOOK 40, app. at 186 (1998) [hereinafter MASS. PROCUREMENT HANDBOOK].
Vol. 34
2001 Massachusetts, Burma, and the World Trade Organization 7
subsidiaries, affiliates, or branches operating in Massachusetts. 35
The Massachusetts Burma Law was not an isolated measure, or
unprecedented. As of June 2000, when the Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in the Massachusetts case, twenty-four municipal, county, or state
governments had enacted selective purchasing laws specifically targeting
Burma.3 6 Similar measures were pending in a number of other jurisdic-
tions.37 Selective purchasing requirements have a long history, particularly
in Massachusetts, tracing back to early colonial boycotts of English
goods.38 Moreover, the model for the Burma selective purchasing measure
became well established with the state and local laws targeting apartheid in
South Africa during the 1970s and 1980s. 3 9
In 1976, Madison, Wisconsin passed the first selective purchasing law
aimed at those doing business with South Africa.40 Two years later, Cotati,
California became the first U.S. jurisdiction to prohibit investing its funds
in companies doing business in South Africa, followed shortly by decisions
in Berkeley and Oakland not to conduct business with banks that had
South African ties.4 1 By the time Nelson Mandela called for the lifting of
sanctions in September 1993, thirty-two states and 151 county or local
governments in the United States had passed similar laws,4 2 of which sev-
enty-three were selective purchasing measures. 43
U.S. direct investment in South Africa dropped from $2.6 billion to
less than $700 million by the late 1980s, and more than 210 U.S. compa-
nies sold their South African operations during this period.44 Although the
sanctions on South Africa spanned the globe, President Clinton stated that
"Americans had a lot to do with ending apartheid.., by the sanctions...
that swept cities and states across the country .... -5 The South African
sanctions remain the preeminent example, cited by proponents of state and
local sanctions, of the value of selective purchasing laws and similar mea-
35. Amicus Curiae Brief European Communities and Member States at app., Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998), available at
USA*ENGAGE, http://www.usaengage.org/resources/EU.html (reprinting the Massa-
chusetts Restricted Burma Purchase List).
36. USA*ENGAGE, State and Local Sanctions Watch List, at http://www.usaen-
gage.org/news/status.html (last modified Mar. 2000).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE NON-IMPORTA-
lION MovEMNmrr 191-201, 212-14 (1917).
39. See Free Burma, Selective Purchasing: A Brief History, at http://www.ibiblio.org/
freeburma/boycott/sp/bsp.history.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2000). The state and local
anti-apartheid measures built upon local laws from the 1950s and 1960s that targeted
those "doing business" with the Communist Block countries. See INVESTOR RESPONSIBIL-
ITY RESEARCH CTR., STATE AND LOCAL SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAWS AS OF JULY 1998 1 &
n.1 (1998) [hereinafter SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws].
40. PETER DESImoNE & WILLIAM F. MosES, INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CR., A
GUIDE TO AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL LAWS ON SOUTH AmcA 1 (1995).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2.
43. SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAWs, supra note 39, app. B at 12.
44. DESIMONE & MOSES, supra note 40, at 3.
45. Free Burma, supra note 39, at http://www.ibiblio.org/freeburma/boycott/sp/
bsphistory.html.
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sures that essentially force businesses to decide who is the more important
customer-the targeted country or the state and local government in the
United States.46
Berkeley, California passed the first Burma law in February 1995, 47
not long after Nelson Mandela was elected President of South Africa.48 But
the Burma laws are just one in a series of state and local sanctions mea-
sures that followed the anti-apartheid movement. For example, seventeen
states and over forty local governments have selective purchasing laws
aimed at promoting equal employment opportunities for Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland under the MacBride Principles.49 Named
after the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Chairman of Amnesty International,
Sean MacBride, and established jointly by the New York City Comptroller's
Office and the Irish National Caucus in 1984, the nine MacBride Princi-
ples call for nondiscrimination in employment and affirmative action to
increase opportunities for religious minorities in Northern Ireland.50 Like
the Statement of Principles for South Africa, formulated in 1977 by the
Reverend Leon Sullivan while he was serving on the Board of General
Motors,5 1 the MacBride Principles represent a voluntary corporate code of
conduct. However, in a manner similar to the tightening of the South Afri-
can sanctions in the late 1970s and 1980s, these state and local govern-
ment selective purchasing laws required that businesses with employees,
affiliates, or franchisees in Northern Ireland comply with the voluntary
MacBride Principles or be penalized when bidding on state and local gov-
ernment procurements.52 The MacBride Principles campaign, while gener-
ally opposed by the British Government, is nevertheless viewed as
strengthening the Fair Employment Act in Northern Ireland and keeping
46. See, e.g., Free Burma, Burma Purchasing Laws: Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.ibiblio.org/freeburma/boycott/sp/bspjfaq.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2000).
47. Berkeley, Cal., Ordinance 57,881-N.S. (Feb. 28, 1995), reprinted in SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 28-32. Ann Arbor, Oakland, San Francisco, and
Santa Monica also passed Burma laws prior to Massachusetts, although Massachusetts
was the first state. USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaengage.org/news/
status.html.
48. Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first democratically elected President of
South Africa on May 10, 1994. Afr. Nat'l Congress, Biography of Nelson Mandela, at
http://www.anc.org.za/people/mandela.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000); see also Free
Burma, supra note 39, at http://www.ibiblio.org/freeburma/boycott/spbsphistory.
html.
49. SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 109-52; Press Release, Irish Nat'l
Caucus, MacBride Principles Become Law in California (Sept. 15, 1999), available at
http://www.knight-hub.com/inc/RpressR.html; Irish N. Aid Comm., The MacBride Prin-
ciples Campaign, at http://inac.org/ACTDIR/ACTMACB.HTML (last visited Mar. 22,
2000).
50. SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 7; see also Irish Nat'l Caucus, The
MacBride Principles (Dec. 1997), at http://www.knight-hub.com/inc/macbride.html.
51. Leon Sullivan, Statement of Principles for South Africa (1992), available at Corpo-
rate Watch, http://www.corpwatch.org/trac/feature/humanrts/resources/safrica-princi-
ples.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000). The Sullivan Principles established an aspirational
corporate code of conduct for those doing business in South Africa, which antedated,
but was incorporated into, the later state and local government anti-apartheid measures.
52. SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 7.
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the issue of equality on the table.5 3
Also, state and local governments across the United States have passed
various measures expressing opposition to Castro's government in Cuba,
5 4
ethnic strife and human rights violations in Nigeria,5 5 the Chinese occupa-
tion of Tibet,5 6 Indonesia's actions in East Timor,5 7 and the Swiss banks'
handling of Nazi loot and property from the victims of the Holocaust.
5 8
Proponents consider these measures "tools for democracy" because they
are often intended to promote democratic reforms in the target country
and because they reflect a local government response to grassroots con-
cerns about conditions or actions in other countries.
5 9
As governments adopted these various measures over the last twenty-
five years, the "model" for selective purchasing measures solidified, a
model that the Massachusetts statute generally followed. Typically, each
business that wishes to contract with a particular state or local government
must be "evaluated" or "qualified" as able to do business with the govern-
ment entity, either in advance of bidding60 or as an integral part of the
evaluation criteria for contract bids.6 1 It is not unusual for a government
to: require a potential contractor to submit affidavits, certifications, or
other documentary evidence of their-and their subcontractors'-ability to
do the work required; 62 provide references and financial statements;
63
meet applicable recordkeeping, minimum wage, security, bonding, liability,
or insurance requirements;6 4 accept standard terms and, conditions; 65 or
comply with any number of governmental policies or practices. In addition
to selective purchasing requirements, 66 these polices or practices may
include, for example, policies promoting the use of environmentally-sensi-
tive products, 6 7 encouraging the participation of minority- or women-
owned businesses in the procurement process, 68 complying with the gov-
53. Id.
54. USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaengage.org/news/status.html
(listing Dade County, Florida as imposing selective purchasing and investment restric-
tions directed at Cuba).
55. SELECrivE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 4-5.
56. Id. at 5-6.
57. USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaengage.org/news/status.html
(listing Cambridge, Massachusetts as imposing selective purchasing restrictions directed
at Indonesia).
58. U.S. Official Warns Against Swiss Sanctions, REUTERS, July 23, 1998, available at
USA*ENGAGE, http://www.usaengage.org/news/980724swiss.html (describing New
York sanctions pending against Swiss banks).
59. See, e.g., Free Burma, Selective Purchasing: A Tool for Democracy, at http://
www.ibiblio.org/freeburma/boycott/sp (last visited Dec. 2, 2000).
60. E.g., MASS. PROCUREMaENr HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 60-61.
61. E.g., id. at 37-42.
62. E.g., id. at 76-77.
63. E.g., id. at 78.
64. E.g., id. at 81-83.
65. E.g., id. at 89-92.
66. E.g., id. at 93.
67. E.g., id. at 83-84.
68. E.g., id. at 31-32.
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ernment entity's affirmative action plan,69 or disqualifying bidders who
previously violated state or federal procurement laws. 70 Thus, compliance
with the selective purchasing requirement is just one of a host of obliga-
tions and undertakings built into the normal governmental procurement
process.
The standard selective purchasing mechanism employs a blacklist of
businesses that fit within a statutory or regulatory definition of "doing bus-
iness" with the sanctioned target. The government compiles this list on the
basis of information submitted by the particular bidder as part of the pro-
curement process or obtained from third-party advocacy groups, such as
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), 71 or other governmen-
tal organizations, such as the California Public Employees' Retirement Sys-
tem (CalPERS). 72 Persons or entities with a direct presence, investment, or
employees in a targeted destination are universally defined as "doing busi-
ness" with the target.73 Some selective purchasing measures also define a
variety of "non-equity ties" as "doing business" with the sanctioned coun-
try, such as arms-length licensing, distribution, or franchising agree-
ments.74 It is also fairly common to extend the blacklist to include the
parent or subsidiary companies of business entities who do business with
a sanctioned country whether or not they conduct business with the target
themselves, thereby extending the coercive force of the sanctions or boycott
to a secondary level. 75
Subsequently, when determining the lowest "evaluated" bid for any
given procurement, the government penalizes the blacklisted bidders by
increasing the evaluated, not actual, cost of their bid by five or ten percent;
some selective purchasing measures even disqualify the blacklisted parties
altogether.76 Commonly, these laws provide exceptions for situations
where no alternative supplier of comparable goods and services meets the
terms of the selective purchasing requirement 77 or for essential procure-
ments.78 Sometimes governments also exempt specific types of businesses
or organizations, such as news organizations or providers of medical or
relief services, or particular industries, such as telecommunications. 79
69. E.g., id. at 92-93.
70. E.g., id. at 41.
71. IRRC, Welcome to IRRC!, at http://www.irrc.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2000).
72. Office of Govtl. Affairs, CalPERS, Legislation, at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/
whatshap/legislat/legislat.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2000).
73. SEcrIaVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 2.
74. Id.
75. Some selective purchasing laws go so far as to include affiliates, divisions, joint
ventures, syndicates, and partnerships with such firms within the scope of their defini-
tion of "doing business" with a sanctioned destination. Id. This use of a secondary boy-
cott in trade sanctions is increasingly suspect under emerging standards of international
law. Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 87-96.
76. SELECtIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 1.
77. For example, San Francisco reportedly awarded contracts for construction of
light rail projects despite the applicability of the city's Burma Law to each of the quali-
fied bidders. Id. at 2.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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B. Social and Political Background
These selective purchasing measures transform essentially private actions,
the "ethical" purchasing decisions of individual consumers, into determi-
nants of public behavior. Operating at a "distinctive intersection between
civic life (ostensibly governed by principles of 'public good') and the cor-
porate profit-making motive,"80 these state and local sanctions reflect
a collective realization among many public, civic and religious institutions
that having a multinational corporation as a guest in your house - whether
as a supplier or a sponsor - presents an important political opportunity.
With their huge buying power, public and non-profit institutions can exert
real public-interest pressure on otherwise freewheeling private
corporations.81
When individuals succeed in urging state and local public bodies to
adopt these measures, they seek to influence the behavior of the blacklisted
businesses and the targeted foreign government. Significantly, these move-
ments occur at a level of government that more closely reflects local and
popular concerns, than national policies. The obvious intent of these sanc-
tions is to force businesses to decide which customers are more important:
state and local governmental entities in the United States or the customers
located in the sanctioned country. A number of companies, such as Apple
Computer, Phillips Electronics, PepsiCo, and Texaco, decided to terminate
operations in Burma, at least in part due to the economic impact of the
various sanctions laws.8
2
The "penalty" mechanism at the heart of selective purchasing mea-
sures would logically seem to result in local governments, and their taxpay-
ers, paying more for goods and services than they otherwise might if
companies do not withdraw. However, Massachusetts and some other
jurisdictions assert that this has not been their experience in practice.8 3
There might be a number of reasons for this non-intuitive result. Many
state and local contractors have no foreign operations or connections and
are unaffected by these laws. Moreover, companies that conduct business
with sanctioned countries sometimes find that they face little or no compe-
tition when bidding on state and local government contracts, so that the
evaluation "penalty" is inapplicable or inconsequential in the overall bid-
ding process.84
Additionally, the state and local government experience administering
these laws has been quite mixed. Governments, particularly smaller juris-
dictions and governmental bodies, do not always apply selective purchas-
ing laws rigorously and uniformly. Moreover, establishing and
administering a blacklist adds time and expense to the procurement pro-
cess. Some jurisdictions lack adequate funding to research and support
80. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 400.
81. Id. at 401.
82. SELECrIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 2.
83. Id. at 2-3.
84. Id.
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blacklisting, and others find themselves spending an inordinate amount of
time and money addressing whether or not their blacklists are properly
applied.85 Thus, state and local sanctions measures, like many governmen-
tal policy measures, are recognized as imperfect tools.
There have been dramatic changes since the first sanctions directed at
the apartheid regime in South Africa. Each of the players, government, bus-
iness, consumers, and advocacy groups, learned from their experiences
over the last quarter century, and new players concerned with interna-
tional sanctions, such as the WTO, now join them. The proponents of state
and local sanctions, within and without government, shifted to placing
increased emphasis on selective purchasing laws rather than alternatives
such as disinvestment measures. 86 Disinvestment measures only indirectly
impact the behavior of blacklisted corporations and, as a practical matter,
eliminate a government's ability to engage corporate entities in a continu-
ing dialogue on the issues motivating the sanctions.87 Accordingly, divest-
ment measures are now considered more symbolic than effective.88 On the
other side, companies that respond to state and local divestment or selec-
tive purchasing measures by withdrawing from targeted markets some-
times find themselves unable to effectively reenter those markets once
governments lift the sanctions. Eastman Kodak and PepsiCo, for example,
faced stiff competition when they tried to reenter the South African market,
and Pepsi was ultimately unsuccessful in reestablishing operations in
South Africa.89
Moreover, the proliferation of different sanctions campaigns impacts
the ability of some jurisdictions to find "acceptable" bidders for its
procurements. International construction companies, petroleum compa-
nies, and telecommunications contractors, for example, might be able to
comply with some selective purchasing laws but not others. Consequently,
state or local governments sometimes found they must waive their selective
purchasing measures or run an insufficiently-competitive procurement. 90
Berkeley, California City Councilor Polly Armstrong, for example, report-
85. The IRRC reported, for example, that Takoma Park, Maryland has no budget
allocated to administer and support its Burma Law. Oakland, California and Massachu-
setts more aggressively supported their respective Burma laws' allocated resources for
researching who should be blacklisted and for supporting the logistics necessary to
apply their laws. However, they found that even though most companies identified in
their respective Burma blacklists are not currently conducting business with the govern-
ment, these companies nevertheless vigorously opposed being blacklisted, resulting in a
time-consuming and costly administrative process. Id. at 3.
86. Id. at 12-13.
87. The debate over "engagement" versus "sanctions" commonly arises where gov-
ernments use trade to pursue policy goals. For example, consider the Clinton adminis-
tration's efforts to get Congress to establish permanent normal trade relations with
China. E.g.,Joseph Kahn, Last-Ditch Effort by 2 Sides to Win China Trade Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
May 23, 2000, at Al; China Trade Relations Working Group, The Clinton Administration
Statement on Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China: A Strong Deal in the Best Inter-
ests of America, at http://www.chinapntr.gov/statement.htm (last visited May 23, 2000).
88. SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 12-13.
89. Id. at 14.
90. Id. at 13.
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edly quipped, "Pretty soon we'll have to do our own offshore drilling," fol-
lowing the city's vote to discontinue municipal gasoline purchases from the
major oil companies. 9 1 The proliferation of state and local sanctions also
prompted the opponents of these measures to become increasingly organ-
ized and active, establishing industry groups such as USA*ENGAGE, to
lobby against sanctions in the name of free trade. 92
All the parties have embraced technology to great effect. In the case of
Burma, the organizations opposing the SLORC/SPDC mounted an exten-
sive online campaign to coordinate their efforts through e-mail, the online
BurmaNet,9 3  and similar Internet sites.94  On the other side,
USA*ENGAGE, with more than 600 major businesses as members, used its
web site and e-mail lists to coordinate support for the suit by its parent
organization, the National Foreign Trade Council, against the Massachu-
setts Burma law.9 ' The Free Burma campaign directed against Pepsi illus-
trated the growing importance and impact of technology on these issues
over the past decade. The campaign progressed from an unheralded grass-
roots boycott to a catalyst for passage of state and local selective purchas-
ing laws around the country.
Pepsi opened a bottling'plant in Rangoon in late 1991 as a joint ven-
ture with a prominent business figure associated with the SLORC.9 6 Bur-
mese dissidents immediately denounced Pepsi's new plant as providing tax
monies and support for the military junta.97 At roughly the same time,
Pepsi, like other companies, was trying to capture the youth market by
expanding its presence at schools and universities.98 Students at Carleton
University in Ottawa, Canada, the location of one of Pepsi's earliest exclu-
sive vending deals, became concerned about the company's business in
Burma and distributed a flyer in early 1993 detailing the situation in
Burma and linking Pepsi's joint venture to the SLORC and that govern-
91. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 397.
92. SELEcnvE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 13.
93. Id. at 12-13; see also FreeBurma.org, Mailing Lists, at http://freeburma.org/
lists.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000); Free Burma Coalition, Welcome to the Free Burma
Coalition, at http://www.freeburmacoalition.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
94. Infra notes 100-13, 172-97 and accompanying text.
95. SELEcTwE PURCHASING LAWs, supra note 39, at 13; see also USA*ENGAGE,
USA*ENGAGE, at http://www.usaengage.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
96. Reid Cooper, A Historical Look at the Pepsico/Burma Boycott, BoYcorr Q., Sum-
mer 1997, available at Third World Traveler, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Boy-
cotts/Hx_-PepsiBurmaBoy.html (last visited May 25, 2000).
97. Just prior to the Pepsi plant's opening, Thaung Htun of the All Burma Students
Democratic Front (ABSDF) declared, "We have long protested foreign investment in
Burma. The tax that Pepsi pays the junta will be used to buy arms and ammunition to
oppress the Burmese people," and he "strongly urgeld] all democratic-minded people
and all human rights advocates to stop drinking Pepsi." Pepsi's Press Relations Manager
responded by stating, "[Wie don't invest in governments or political systems. We invest
in people and people are consumers." Boycott Pepsi, Burmese Dissidents Urge as Rangoon
Plant Opens, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, Nov. 22, 1991, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
98. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 91 (noting the establishment of the "Pepsi Achievement
Awards," various exclusive vending contracts, and marketing efforts aimed at naming
Pepsi the "Official" soft drink of various schools). See generally id. at 87-105 (discussing
"The Branding of Learning: Ads in Schools and Universities").
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ment's abuse of human rights.99 Students posted the flyer to various
Usenet newsgroups. 10 0 This flyer prompted increased interest at other uni-
versities where Pepsi was the "official" soft-drink, and a special newsgroup
was created to discuss the situation in Burma. 10 1 Students also established
the BurmaNet e-mail newsletter. 10 2
These tools played a significant role in spreading the emerging Pepsi
boycott campaign and distributing campus "info pak" action kits to several
hundred groups around the world by late 1995.103 These kits contained
background information on Burma and Pepsi's involvement, as well as
stickers parodying Pepsi's slogans as "Pepsi: The Choice of a New Geno-
cide."' 0 4 The kits urged students to "[p]ressure schools to terminate food
or beverage contracts selling PepsiCo products until it leaves Burma."''1 5
Additionally, the Free Burma Coalition 10 6 was one of the first activist
groups to take full advantage of the World Wide Web when it established
its web site in 1995107 with the support of the Soros Foundation and the
Open Society Institute. 10 8 This site later became the basis for the current
99. Terry Cottam, the coordinator of the Carleton University Public Interest
Research Group Southeast Asia Working Group, produced the original flyer. Reid
Cooper noted:
Three things were noteworthy about that first flyer. One, the information-rich flyer
provided footnotes for its claims. In addition to helping people find more information on
their own, it documented its claims, which gave the flyer a vital element of credibility.
Two, more than simply a flyer on Pepsi, it served as a general introduction to Burma's
struggle. Three, the flyer subverted PepsiCo's contrived image of fun and freedom by
turning its own slogans against it. Future updates of that first flyer, despite often radical
revisions, always kept those three virtues.
Cooper, supra note 96.
100. The Usenet is a collection of e-mail-like notes posted to online bulletin boards on
various subjects, known as "newsgroups." There are thousands of newsgroups, which
are hosted or distributed over various computer servers. Although most Usenet new-
sgroups are available through Internet servers, the Usenet predates the current Internet
infrastructure. See whatis?com, whatis?com, at http://whatis.techtarget.com (last visited
May 25, 2000) (search for "Usenet" or "newsgroup").
101. Deja.com, Forum: soc.culture. burma, at http://www.deja.com/group/soc.culture.
burma (last visited May 25, 2000).
102. See FreeBurma.org, supra note 93, at http://freeburma.org/lists.html (providing
subscription information for BurmaNet News).
103. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 402; Cooper, supra note 96.
104. Jay Mathews, Pepsi to Sell Burma Plant, Citing Protests, WASH. POST, Apr. 24,
1996, at F3 [hereinafter Mathews, Pepsi to Sell]; Jay Mathews, Student Critics of Burma
Trying to Put Pepsi on Ice: Company's Presence in Nation Protested, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
1996, at D9 [hereinafter Mathews, Student Critics].
105. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 402.
106. Free Burma Coalition, supra note 93, at http://www.freeburmacoalition.org.
107. Zarni, a principal figure in the Free Burma Coalition, indicated that "[i]n seven
weeks," following the establishment of the web site, "this campaign . . . pretty much
exploded" and that "[w]ithout the Internet, this would have been impossible," Ann Scott
Tyson, Political Activism on Campus Takes on a Cyberspace Twist, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR,
Oct. 31, 1995, at 3; see also A. Lin Neumann, The Resistance Network, WIRED, Jan. 1996,
at 109.
108. Neumann, supra note 107, at 109; see also Open Soc'y Inst., Open Society Insti-
tute, at http://www.soros.org/osi.html (last visited May 25, 2000).
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BurmaNet web site.109 The use of these various tools prompted Mike
Jendrzejczk, the Washington Director of Human Rights Watch/Asia, to
comment, "Cyberspace spawned the movement to restore human rights to
Burma."' 10
Proponents of reform in Burma used Internet communications to pro-
ceed simultaneously on a variety of fronts: uniting and spreading the cam-
pus boycott, seeking sanctions legislation at the federal and state level, and
prompting and supporting shareholder action against Pepsi. The Internet
made it possible for a relatively small number of activists to have a greater
impact in part because electronic communications bypass the editing that
occurs in the traditional media and the filtering that naturally occurs when
relying upon third parties such as international nongovernmental organi-
zations.11' With the Internet, those concerned with a particular issue can
avoid the sporadic coverage afforded by other media; supply almost daily
reports, commentary, and analysis to their supporters; and maintain an
effective and relatively inexpensive means of coordinating responsive
action.'1 2 As Simon Billenness declared, the Burma effort was "one of the
first cyber-campaigns .... If something happens in Rangoon, I'm going to
know about it the next day by reading my e-mail .... The Internet has
proved to be an invaluable tool for organization."' "13
By 1996, the campus boycott had gained sufficient momentum that
Harvard rejected a $1 million vending contract with Pepsi, after students
raised concerns regarding Pepsi's dealings with Burma.1" 4 Similarly, stu-
dents blocked the construction of a Pepsi-owned Taco Bell restaurant at
Stanford after two thousand students signed a petition opposing the con-
tract, worth an estimated $800,000."1 Later that year, the campaign
picked up further momentum when the Third World First organization,' 16
with chapters on forty percent of university campuses in the United King-
dom, made the Pepsi boycott a major issue.117 The National Union of Stu-
dents coordinated university soft-drink contracts in Britain, and with Pepsi
being sold in over 800 student unions at the time, the company faced a
109. See Burma Project, Open Soc'y Inst., The Burma Project: Broadening the Debate on
Burma, at http://www.soros.orglburma/index.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2000); Free
Burma, Welcome to Free Burma, at http://www.ibiblio.org/freeburma (last visited Dec. 2,
2000).
110. Nigel Holloway, Caught in the Net: U.S. Sanctions Debate Moves to Cyberspace,
FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 28, 1996, at 28.
111. Jamie F. Metzl, Information Technology and Human Rights, 18 HuM. RTS. Q. 705,
713 (1996).
112. Id. at 712-13.
113. Joe Urschel, Activists Make Inroads with U.S. Companies, USA TODAY, Apr. 29,
1996, at IA.
114. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 402; Cooper, supra note 96.
115. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 402.
116. Established in 1969 as the student arm of Oxfam to raise money for overseas
aid, Third World First soon became the largest student activist network in the United
Kingdom. The organization is now independent of Oxfam and known as People &
Planet. People & Planet, Who are People & Planet?, at http://www.peopleandplanet.org/
aboutus/index.htm (last visited May 29, 2000).
117. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 402-03; Cooper, supra note 96.
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rapidly growing international boycott. 118 This increasing pressure, at least
in part, led to Pepsi's announcement in late April 1996 that it was selling
its interest in the Burmese bottling plant.119 But the story and the Pepsi
protests were not finished.
While the student protests were growing in the mid-1990s, substantial
support was also building through the Internet for various national "Burma
laws," including the McConnell-Moynihan bill,120 which sought to impose
mandatory federal sanctions on Burma for its human rights abuses. 121
Ultimately, however, traditional lobbying by the petroleum companies com-
bined with the Clinton administration's demand for greater diplomatic
flexibility than permitted by mandatory sanctions resulted in the imposi-
tion of the conditional, and more limited, federal sanctions embodied in
then-Senator William Cohen's amendments 122 to the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997.123
Senator Cohen's measure passed on September 30, 1996,124 three months
after the Massachusetts Burma Law, 125 reflecting the cumulative effect of
the Burma campaign on legislators at all levels. At the time the federal sanc-
tions passed, in addition to Massachusetts, local governments in Berke-
ley,126 Oakland, 127 San Francisco, 128 and Santa Monica, California; 129
118. KLEIN, supra note 17, at 402-03.
119. Mathews, Pepsi to Sell, supra note 104, at F3.
120. Free Burma Act of 1995, S. 1092, 104th Cong. (1995).
121. Holloway, supra note 110, at 30. The McConnell-Moynihan bill would have lim-
ited new investment in Burma by U.S. citizens, prohibited the use of U.S. passports for
travel to Burma, required the President to negotiate with other countries regarding multi-
lateral sanctions, and required the imposition of trade sanctions on those countries that
failed to sanction Burma. S. 1092.
122. H.R. 3540, 104th Cong. (1996); Holloway, supra note 110, at 30.
123. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-166 to 3009-167 thereinafter
Federal Burma Sanctions Act]. This law, along with the International Emergency Eco-
nomic Powers Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 202-207, 91 Stat. 1625 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994)), set the stage for the sanctions imposed by
Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997). At that
time, President Clinton prohibited any new investments or facilitating new investments
by others in Burma by U.S. persons, but permitted sales and purchase transactions. Id.,
Burmese Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.101-.901 (1999); infra notes 238-46
and accompanying text.
124. Federal Burma Sanctions Act, supra note 123.
125. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
126. Berkeley's measure was the first Burma law, passed in March 1995. Berkeley,
Cal., Ordinance 57,881-N.S. (Feb. 28, 1995), reprinted in SELECTrV PURCHASING LAws,
supra note 39, at 28-32; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaengage.org/
news/status.html (listing Berkeley, California).
127. Oakland, Cal., SP Law 11,885 (May 7, 1996), reprinted in SELECTIVE Pu RCHASING
LAws, supra note 39, at 49-56; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaen-
gage.org/news/status.html (listing Oakland, California).
128. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 159-96 (Apr. 22, 1996), reprinted in SELECTIVE PURCHASING
LAws, supra note 39, at 59-64; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaen-
gage.org/news/status.html (listing San Francisco, California).
129. Santa Monica, Cal., Resolution 9866 (Nov. 28, 1995), reprinted in SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 71-72; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.
usaengage.org/news/status.html (listing Santa Monica, California).
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Ann Arbor, Michigan; 130 and Madison, Wisconsin1 31 had already passed
measures opposing government purchasing from those engaged in busi-
ness in Burma. Similar measures passed in Alameda County, California;' 32
Bolder, Colorado;1 33 Takoma Park, Maryland;134 and Carrboro, North Car-
olina135 by the time President Clinton implemented federal sanctions by
Executive Order in May 1997.136 But it was the combination of the campus
boycott, legislation, and the third prong of the campaign-shareholder reso-
lutions-that finally pushed Pepsi to terminate its business relationships
with Burma.
Franklin Research and Development Corporation, a socially responsi-
ble investment firm now known as Trillium Asset Management, 137 helped
form the Coalition for Corporate Withdrawal from Burma in August 1993,
after the call for economic and investment sanctions made by ten Nobel
Peace Prize laureates.' 38 Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who was among the
group calling for sanctions on Burma, declared that "[tiough sanctions, not
constructive engagement, finally brought the release of Nelson Mandela
and the dawn of a new era in my country. This is the language that must be
spoken with tyrants - for, sadly, it is the only language they under-
stand."' 39 Accordingly, as an analyst with Franklin Research and director
of the Coalition for Corporate Withdrawal, Simon Billenness adapted the
techniques used in the anti-apartheid campaign and drafted shareholder
resolutions calling for businesses to withdraw from Burma, beginning with
130. Ann Arbor, Mich., Resolution Barring Purchases from Businesses in Burma and
from Those Doing Business with Burma (Apr. 15, 1996), reprinted in SEIECrTIVE PURCHAS-
ING LAWs, supra note 39, at 27; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaen-
gage.org/news/status.html (listing Ann Arbor, Michigan).
131. Madison, Wis., Resolution 52,471 (Aug. 16, 1995), reprinted in SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAWS, supra note 39, at 39-40; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://
-vww.usaengage.org/news/status.html (listing Madison, Wisconsin).
132. Alameda County, Cal., Ordinance (Dec. 12, 1996), reprinted in SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAWs, supra note 39, at 19-26; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://
www.usaengage.org/news/status.html (listing Alameda County, California).
133. Boulder, Colo., Ordinance 5855 (Dec. 18, 1996), reprinted in SELEcTIVE PURCHAS-
ING LAWS, supra note 39, at 33-35; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://
www.usaengage.org/news/status.html (listing Boulder, Colorado).
134. Takoma Park, Md., Ordinance 1996-33 (Oct. 28, 1996), reprinted in SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAWS, supra note 39, at 74-80; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://
www.usaengage.org/news/status.html (listing Takoma Park, Maryland).
135. Carrboro, N.C., Ordinance 18/96-97 (Oct. 8, 1996), reprinted in SELECTIVE
PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 37; USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://
wwwv.usaengage.org/news/status.html (listing Carrboro, North Carolina).
136. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997). Nine other local
jurisdictions have passed selective purchasing measures aimed at Burma since the fed-
eral sanctions became effective. SELECTIVE PURCHASING LAws, supra note 39, at 15-81;
USA*ENGAGE, supra note 36, at http://www.usaengage.org/news/status.html.
137. Trillium Asset Management Corporation is the oldest and largest independent,
"socially responsible" investment firm. Trillium Asset Mgmt., Trillium Asset Management
Corporation - Socially Responsible Investing, at http://www.trilliuminvest.com/index.
html (last visited May 30, 2000).
138. John N. Maclean, Abuses in Burma Stir Questions of Conscience, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
25, 1993, (Business), at 3.
139. Desmond Tutu, Burma as South Africa, Far E. Econ. Rev., Sept. 16, 1993, at 23.
Cornell International Law Journal
Amoco. The aim of this effort, according to Billenness, was not to have
investors sell their shares, but to motivate "institutional investors-espe-
cially large public pension funds and universities-to vote their shares in
favor of resolutions filed by Coalition supporters.' 140 Although the Amoco
shareholder proposals failed to pass, Amoco did announce their with-
drawal from Burma within two years of the beginning of this effort.14 1
Billenness also submitted shareholder resolutions to Pepsi, Texaco,
and Unocal in 1994 and expanded the effort in subsequent years.14 2 The
successive submission of these shareholder resolutions in coordination
with the other activities in the Burma campaign prompted a prolonged dia-
logue between Pepsi's management and shareholder activists, 143 as well as
Pepsi's business clients. 144 By 1996, when student groups on seventy-five
U.S. campuses were busy plastering anti-Pepsi stickers on vending
machines 14 5 and seven local jurisdictions had passed selective purchasing
measures, 14 6 Pepsi's general counsel and corporate secretary met with
shareholder activists, who were proposing a new "code of conduct" for the
company,14 7 to announce a change in direction. 14 8 Although the company
140. Coalition Opposes Burma Business Ties, 33 CHRISTIAN CErNURY 1152, 1153
(1993).
141. After failing to win approval of the 1993 Amoco shareholder proposal, Billenness
resubmitted it for the 1994 annual meeting. Shortly before announcing its withdrawal
from Burma "for economic reasons," Amoco succeeded in having the Security and
Exchange Commission exclude the renewed proposal. Although Amoco said they were
leaving Burma for economic reasons, Billenness noted that "the negative public relations
and the potential negative economic impact of our boycott also were included in
[Amoco's] decision-making." John N. Maclean, Amoco Calls Pullout from Burma an Eco-
nomic Move, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 4, 1994, (Business), at 1.
142. Aaron Freeman, Burma-Human Rights: Burma the Target of New Divestment Calls,
INTER PREss SERvicE, June 14, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, INPRES File; Ruling on Burma
Proposal a Bad Omen for Shareholders, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 27, 1994, at 11,
LEXIS, News Library, SCHINA File. More recently, shareholder activists targeted ARCO
and Baker Hughes for shareholder proposal efforts. Only Unocal still does business in
Burma. Trillium Asset Mgmt., Burma as South Africa: An Issue for Investors, at http://
www.trilliuminvest.com/pages/social/sociaL05.html (last visited May 30,'2000); Free
Burma Coalition, Free Burma Coalition: Selective Purchasing Update, at http://
www.freeburmacoalition.org/victories/corporatepullout/cwupdate.html (last visited
May 30, 2000).
143. This dialogue was not always free from contention. Pepsi's then-Chairman and
CEO, Wayne Calloway, reportedly accused the Burma activists of "dealing in coercion
and strong-arm tactics." Freeman, supra note 142.
144. For example, Starbucks allegedly refused to let a new coffee drink that it mar-
keted jointly with Pepsi be produced or sold in Burma. Id.
145. Mathews, Pepsi to Sell, supra note 104, at F3; Mathews, Student Critics, supra note
104, at D13.
146. Simon Billenness and Franklin Research also organized the New England Burma
Round Table, helped formulate the Massachusetts Burma law and secure its passage,
and assisted groups seeking passage of similar measures elsewhere within the United
States and abroad. Trillium Asset Mgmt., supra note 142, at http://www.trilli-
uminvest.com/pages/social/social_05.html.
147. Franklin Research, and the Roman Catholic missionary group the Maryknoll
Fathers and Brothers, submitted the shareholder resolution endorsing a code of conduct
with regard to Burma in 1995. Although not adopted, it did receive enough votes to be
included on: the ballot for the May 1996 annual meeting. Mathews, Student Critics, supra
note 104, at D13.
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had previously insisted that "free trade leads to free societies," in April
1996, it decided to sell its minority interest in the Burma bottling plant,
citing the sentiment expressed by the shareholder activists about investing
in Burma.' 49
However, Pepsi only sold its equity interest in the bottling plant. Its
franchise, licensing, and supply agreements remained.' 5 0 The protest cam-
paign and the shareholder proposals therefore continued largely unabated
because, in Billenness's words, the partial withdrawal "didn't appease any-
one."15 1 Nine months later, in January 1997, Pepsi announced that it had
had enough; it cancelled its contracts and terminated its business relation-
ships with Burma. Pepsi explained that it was terminating its contracts
"[b]ased on [its] assessment of the spirit of current U.S. government pol-
icy,"15 2 although the federal sanctions had yet to take full effect.15 3 The
campaign against Pepsi was over.
In the long run, the "last thing a company like Pepsi wants is to alien-
ate college students. Especially since it's positioned as the soft drink... of
the young generation." 15 4 The campus consumer boycott produced results
in Pepsi's case. Ultimately, however, for Pepsi and the broader Free Burma
campaign, it was the combination of tactics, the boycott, lobbying for legis-
lation, and shareholder proposals, that had real impact and led to the with-
drawal of nearly forty companies from Burma.1 55 Although each prong of
the Pepsi campaign was important, the Massachusetts Burma law and simi-
lar selective purchasing measures were key to the success of the effort and
"the tactic of choice."' 5 6 As Simon Billenness reportedly declared,
"[S]elective purchasing laws [are] 'boycotts on steroids.... [T]hey can hit
companies that aren't consumer oriented, like construction firms. With
regular boycotts, you're limited to companies with brand-name recognition.
These [laws] target everything, and you can affect companies that aren't
based in the U.S.'"15 7
148. Mathews, Pepsi to Sell, supra note 104, at F3.
149. Id.
150. Id. The sale did contribute, however, to the defeat of the 1996 shareholder reso-
lution seeking a complete withdrawal from Burma at the annual meeting, which took
place the following month. Sarah Jackson-Han, Burma Critics Suffer Setback But Plan to
Continue Campaign, AGENCE FR. PRESSE, May 1, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
151. PepsiCo is Ending its Business Relations with Myanmar Firm, FORT WORTH STAR-
TELEGRAM, Jan. 28, 1997, (Business), at 4.
152. Id.
153. Supra note 136 and accompanying text; infra notes 239-45 and accompanying
text.
154. Urschel, supra note 113, at 2A (quoting Al Ries, New York marketing
consultant).
155. Burma Project, Open Soc'y Inst., Corporate Investment/Corporate Withdrawal, at
http://www.soros.org/burma/burmainvestors.html (last visited May 30, 2000). More
than seventy companies still doing business in Burma remain targets of the Burma cam-
paign. Id.
156. Dan Orzech, We Beat Pepsi-What Now? The Battle for Burma Shifts Gears, Boy-
corr Q., Summer 1997, at Third World Traveler, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/
Boycotts/PepsiBurma.BQ.html (last visited May 30, 2000).
157. Sarah Ferguson, Boycotts 'R' Us, VILLAGE VOICE, July 8, 1997, at 44, 46.
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Interestingly, much of the Burma campaign against Pepsi vent largely
unnoticed by the traditional media. Prior to 1995, the press took relatively
little notice of the Pepsi boycott.158 As the boycott spread during 1995,
seventeen articles mentioned it,15 9 and after the successes in 1996, cover-
age in the traditional press exploded to include seventy-four articles that
addressed, at least in part, the Pepsi boycott. 160 Even so, over the nearly
five-year period from the boycott's inception until Pepsi's sale of its Bur-
mese bottling venture in April 1996, only thirteen articles appeared in
"major" papers, such as the Christian Science Monitor,161 the International
Herald Tribune,162 the Los Angeles Times,163 the New York Times,164 the San
Francisco Chronicle,165 the San Francisco Examiner,166 the Toronto Star,167
USA Today,168 the Washington Post,169 or the Washington Times.170 In
essence,
a tiny campus protest movement, taking place almost entirely outside the
media glare.., engaged in a '60s-style revolt that [had] universities, corpora-
tions and international political groups snapping to attention....
158. From the first mention of the boycott, Richard Ehrlich, Burma Captive a Nobel
Favorite, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1991, at A8, LEXIS lists only eleven articles mentioning
the Pepsi and Burma boycott through the end of 1994. Search of LEXIS, News Library,
ALLNWS File through 1994.
159. Search of LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File for 1995 (representing a 155%
increase over the total coverage from 1991 through 1994).
160. Search of LEXIS, News Library, ALLNWS File for 1996 (representing nearly a
435% increase over coverage in 1995 and nearly a 677% increase over the period
through 1994). However, fifty-eight, or 78%, of these articles appeared after Pepsi
announced it was selling its interest in the Rangoon bottling venture in April 1996. Id.
More explosive growth in coverage can be seen if the search is confined to the "major"
news media, which shows only four articles mentioning the boycott prior to 1995, six in
1995 itself, and thirty-three in 1996-twenty-five of which followed Pepsi's announced
sale of its interest in its Burmese venture. Search of LEXIS, News Library, MAJPAP File.
161. Tyson, supra note 107, at 3.
162. Eric Ellis, Consumer Stirrings Visible in Burma; Foreigners Are Flocking In, INT'L
HERALD TaIB., Feb. 20, 1995, LEXIS, News Library, IHT File; Jay Mathews, Youth Protest
Shakes Up Pepsi; Campus Boycott Grows Over Burma Business, INT'L HERALD TaRB., Apr. 6,
1996, LEXIS, News Library, IHT File; Seth Mydans, If Burma Beckons, What's a Multina-
tional to Do?, INT'L HERALD TaiB., Feb. 23, 1996, LEXIS, News Library, IHT File.
163. Susan G. Hauser, Just Say No; It Had to Happen. In an Era of Heightened Con-
sumer Awareness, Wary Shoppers Can Turn to Boycott Quarterly, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995,
at E2.
164. Seth Mydans, Pepsi Courts Myanmar, Preferring Sales to Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1996, at D6.
165. Jonathan Marshall, Bay Area May Join Boycott Of Burma, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 19,
1996, at B1.
166. Tanya Schevitz, Berkeley Boycotts Burma; It's Mostly Symbolic, Co-sponsor Admits,
S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 1, 1995, at A7, LEXIS, News Library, SFEXAM File; Diana Walsh,
S.F. Supervisors, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 16, 1996, at A4, LEXIS, News Library, SFEXAM
File.
167. Ellie Tesher, Join Fight for Freedom in Burma, ToRONTo STAR, June 23, 1995, at
A2.
168. Edna Gundersen, Leaflets to Rain on Woodstock Parade, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 1994,
at ID.
169. Mathews, Student Critics, supra note 104, at D9.
170. Ehrlich, supra note 158, at A8.
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Using the interconnectedness of the modern cyber-university... and
the business savvy of socially conscious investor groups, protestors
[brought] worldwide pressure on the insular and brutally repressive nation
of Myanmar - formerly known as Burma. 17 1
Internet advocacy and cyberspace communications are equally impor-
tant to those seeking selective purchasing measures aimed at other targets.
For their online advocacy, Nigerian groups use the Friends of Nigeria Net-
work 172 and the Kudirat Initiative for Democracy (KIND) web site, named
for Kudirat Abiola, the murdered wife of the late democratically elected
President of Nigeria, Moshood Abiloa.' 73 Other groups with concerns
regarding events in Tibet,1 7 4 East Timor, 175 and Cuba 176 are similarly
resorting to the Internet.
Moreover, the use of the Internet and e-mail is integral to the broader
protests against the machinery of international trade generally, as illus-
trated by the "Battle in Seattle" against the WTO in November 1999177 and
the demonstrations against the World Bank and IMF in Washington, D.C.
in April 2000.178 A large number of groups with incredibly diverse agendas
were involved in those protests and have used the Internet to continue their
efforts. These groups range from self-proclaimed anarchist groups, 179 such
as the Direct Action Network, 180 NO2WTO,' 8 ' or the Ruckus Society;
18 2
171. Urschel, supra note 113, at IA.
172. Friends of Nig., Friends of Nigeria, at http://www.igc.org/kind/fon5.htn (last
visited Mar. 22, 2000); see also Essential Action, Boycott Shell/Free Nigeria Campaign, at
http://www.essentialaction.org/shell/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
173. Kudirat Initiative for Democracy, KIND - Kudirat Initiative for Democracy, at
http://www.igc.org/kind/home.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
174. Int'l Campaign for Tibet, International Campaign for Tibet - Save Tibet, at http://
www.savetibet.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
175. E. Timor Action Network, East Timor Action Network, at http://etan.org (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2000); Foreign Policy Watchdog, East Timor Action Network's Campaign to
Bring the East Timorese Refugees Home, at http://www.execpc.com/-forpolcy/
Timrhome.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
176. Ctr. for Cuban Studies, Center for Cuban Studies Welcome, at http://www.
cubaupdate.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2000).
177. Supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
178. Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
179. For information on a variety of anarchist groups and campaigns, see An Anarch-
ist FAQ Webpage: Version 8.5, at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/1931 (last
updated Oct. 27, 2000); infoshop.org, infoshop.org - Your Guide to Online Anarchy, at
http://www.infoshop.org (last visited June 2, 2000). Those anarchist groups involved in
the recent protests include the Industrial Workers of the World, or wobblies, which was
involved in the Seattle general strike of 1919, and more recent groups, such as the Black
Army Faction and the Anarchist Action Collective based in Eugene, Oregon. Ruth
Teichroeb, Fringe Anarchists in Middle of Violent Demonstrations, SAF..a POsT-INTELLi-
GENCER, Dec. 1, 1999, at A15, available at http://www.seattle-pi.com/local/anar0l.shtml
(last visited June 2, 2000); see also Kim Murphy, A Revolutionary Movement Hits Small-
Town America, L.A. Tiams, Aug. 3, 1999, at Al.
180. Direct Action Network, Direct Action Network Home, at http://wwv.agitprop.org/
artandrevolution/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2000).
181. NO2WTO, Mid-Atlantic Infoshop - NO 2 WTO, at http://www.infoshop.org/
no2wto.html (last visited June 2, 2000).
182. Ruckus Society, The Ruckus Society, at http://www.ruckus.org (last visited Apr.
9, 2000).
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to consumer groups, such as Public Citizen;183 environmental groups;18 4
labor unions;18 5 groups opposing foreign "sweatshop" labor or more gener-
ally promoting indigenous or human rights; 18 6 think tanks; 81 7 and inter-
national financial reformers and others seeking debt relief for third world
countries, 188 as well as numerous others concerned about globalization
183. Global Trade Watch, Public Citizen, Global Trade Watch Home Page, at http://
www.tradewatch.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2000).
184. E.g., Action for Solidarity, Equal., Env't, and Dev., A SEED Europe, at http://
www.antenna.nl/aseed (last visited June 2, 2000); Earthjustice Legal Def. Fund, Interna-
tional, at http://www.earthjustice.org/work/intl_index.html (last visited June 2, 2000);
Friends of the Earth, Trade, Investment and the Environment: Promoting Trade Rules that
Protect the Environment, at http://www.foe.org/international/trade (last visited Apr. 9,
2000); Greenpeace Int'l, Political Issues, at http://www.greenpeace.org/politics (last vis-
ited June 2, 2000); Rainforest Action Network, Mobilization Against Globalization, at
http://www.ran.org/ran-campaigns/wto/index.html (last visited June 2, 2000); Sierra
Club, Trade and the Environment, at http://www.sierraclub.org/trade (last visited June 2,
2000).
185. E.g., AFL-CIO, Make the Global Economy Work for Working Families, at http://
www.aflcio.org/globaleconomy (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, International Affairs, at http://www.iamaw.org/departments/inter-
nationalnew.html (last visited June 2, 2000); Int'l Confederation of Free Trade Unions,
International Trade Secretariats (ITS) Campaigns on Multinational Enterprises, at http://
www.icftu.org (last visitedJune 2, 2000); Teamsters Online, Government Affairs, at http:/
/www.teamster.org/governmt/govt.htm (last visited June 2, 2000); United Auto Work-
ers, Trade Policy, at http://uaw.org/cap/2000/issues/issue17.html (last visited June 2,
2000); United Steelworkers, Trade Policy & The WTO: Fix It ... or Nix It], at http://
www.fixitornixit.com (last visited Apr. 9, 2000).
186. E.g., Abya Yala Fund, Abya Yala Fund for Indigenous Self-Development in South &
Meso America, at http://ayf.nativeweb.org/contents.htm (last visited June 2, 2000);
Clean Clothes Campaign, Clean Clothes Campaign, Nike Main, at http://
www.cleanclothes.org/companies/nike.htm (last visited June 25, 2000); Comm. in Soli-
darity with the People of El Sal., CISPES, at http://www.cispes.org (last visited June 2,
2000); Community Aid Abroad: Australia, NikeWatch: Are Nike Factories Sweatshops
Which Exploit Workers?, at http://www.caa.org.au/campaigns/nike/index.html (last vis-
ited June 25, 2000); Confederation Paysanne, Confederation Paysanne, at http://
www.confederationpaysanne.fr (last visited June 2, 2000); Global Exchange, Global
Economy, at http://www.globalexchange.org/economy (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Indige-
nous Envtl. Network, Indigenous Environmental Network, at http://www.alphacdc.com/
ien (last visited June 2, 2000);Just Do It! Boycott Nike!,Just Do It) Boycott Nihel, at http:/
/www.geocities.com/Athens/Acropolis/5232 (last visited June 25, 2000); Nat'l Labor
Comm., National Labor Committee: In Support of Human and Worker Rights, at http://
www.nlcnet.org (last visited June 2, 2000); NUKE Radioactivewear, NUKE Radioac-
tivewear, at http://www.cybold.com/nuke/index.html (last visited June 25, 2000);
Union of Needletrades, Indus. and Textile Employees, UNITE Stop Sweatshops Cam-
paign, at http://www.uniteunion.org/sweatshops/index.htm (last visited June 2, 2000);
Vietnam Labor Watch, Boycott Nike, at http://www.saigon.com/-nike (last visited June
25, 2000).
187. E.g., Ctr. for Econ. and Policy Research, Center for Economic and Policy Research,
at http://www.cepr.net (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Inst. for Policy Studies, The Institute
for Policy Studies, at http://www.ips-dc.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2000).
188. E.g., 50 Years Is Enough, 50 Years Is Enough: U.S. Network for Global Economic
Justice, at http://www.50years.org/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Alternative
Info. & Dev. Ctr., Alternative Information & Development Centre, at http://www.
aidc.org.za (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Ctr. for Econ. Justice, Center for Economic Justice,
at http://www.econjustice.net (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Comm. for the Abolition of the
Third World Debt, Committee for the Abolition of the Third World Debt, at http://users.
skynet.be/sky74032/y.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Dev. Group for Alternative Poll-
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and multinational corporate activity generally.'8 9
Some tactics associated with these protests, such as "organized coinci-
dences,"'190 "culture jamming,' 9 1 "cyberjamming,"' 92 or outright vandal-
cies, The Development Gap, at http://www.developmentgap.org (last visited Apr. 9,
2000); Focus on the Global S., Focus on the Global South, at http://www.focusweb.org
(last visited Apr. 9, 2000);Jubilee S.,Jubilee South, at http://jubileesouth.net (last visited
Apr. 9, 2000); Jubilee 2000/USA, Jubilee 2000/USA, at http://www.j2000usa.org (last
visited Apr. 9, 2000); Mobilization for Global Justice, Mobilization for Global Justice, at
http://www.al6.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Oxfam Int'l, Human Face of Debt, at
http://www.oxfam.org/advocacy/humanjf.htm (last visited June 2, 2000); ZNet, Global
Economic Crisis, at http://www.zmag.org/CrisesCurEvts/Globalism/GlobalEcon.htm
(last visited Apr. 9, 2000).
189. E.g., Alliance for GlobalJustice, Alliance for Global Justice, at http://www.afgj.org
(last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Corporate Watch, Corporate Watch: The Watchdog on the Web,
at http://www.corpwatch.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Humane Soc'y of the U.S., The
WTO: Have We Traded Away Our Right to Protect Animals, at http://wvw.hsus.org/wto/
index.html (last visited June 2, 2000); Inst. for Agric. and Trade Policy, Welcome to WTO
WATCH, at http://www.wtowatch.org (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Int'l Forum on Global-
ization, International Forum on Globalization, at http://www.ifg.org (last visited Mar. 22,
2000); Peoples' Global Action, Welcome to AGP.org, at http://www.agp.org/agp/
index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Third World Network, Trade Issues, Rules and
WTO, at http://www.twnside.org.sg/trade.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2000); Turning Point
Project, Economic Globalization Series, at http://wvw.turnpoint.org/global.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2000); World Dev. Movement, Current Campaigns, at http://www.
oneworld.net/wdm/campaign/index.htm (last visited June 1, 2000).
190. The "Critical Mass" movement uses the term "organized coincidences" to
describe their monthly events, where large groups of bicyclists simply "materialize" en
masse to overwhelm and take over city streets at different locations. There are, intention-
ally, no particular leaders or organizational sponsorships; thus, no one need take
responsibility, but everyone can take credit. Bicycling Community Page, Critical Mass, at
http://danenet.,vicip.org/bcp/cm.html (last visited June 2, 2000); see also We're Sorry!,
at http://www.sflandmark.com/cm/wesorry.htm (last visited June 2, 2000).
191. Culture jamming refers to "the practice of parodying advertisements and
hijacking billboards in order to drastically alter their messages." KLEIN, supra note 17, at
280. The term derives from "jamming," CB radio slang for interrupting others' transmis-
sions. The band Negativland coined the term to describe various forms of media sabo-
tage during Jamcon '84. MARK DERY, CULTURE JAMMING: HACKING, SLASHING AND SNIPING
IN THE EMPIR OF SIGNS (Open Mag., Pamphlet Series, 1993), available at http://
vww.levity.com/markdery/culturjam.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2000). The practice
extends to more than simply defacing ads, however, including any variety of online or
off-line means to disrupt an advertiser's message "by altering their ads, manipulating
their slogans, exposing their hidden weaknesses, and creating imaginative and effective
parodies and spoofs of their advertisements." Brendan DeMelle, A Critical Analysis of
Culture Jamming: ADBUSTERS and Related Anti-Ad Campaigns, Conclusion, at http://
it.stlawu.edu/-advertiz/jamer/conclusi.html (last visited June 5, 2000).
According to Mark Dery,
culture jamming accommodates a multitude of subcultural practices. Outlaw
computer hacking with the intent of exposing institutional or corporate wrong-
doing is one example; "slashing," or textual poaching, is another. (The term
"slashing" derives from the pornographic "K/S"-short for "Kirk/Spock"-sto-
ries written by female Star Trek fans and published in underground fanzines.
Spun from the perceived homoerotic subtext in Star Trek narratives, K/S, or
"slash," tales are often animated by feminist impulses. I have appropriated the
term for general use, applying it to any form of jamming in which tales told for
mass consumption are perversely reworked.) Transmission jamming; pirate TV
and radio broadcasting; and camcorder countersurveillance (in which low-cost
consumer technologies are used by, DIY muckrakers to document police brutal-
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ism, 19 3 may have surprised many who were unaware of the rising anti-
corporate movement. However, these tactics nevertheless reflect a culture
of "direct action" that has been fostered by and spread over the Internet in
the 1990s through nonviolent movements, such as Critical Mass 194 and
ity or governmental corruption) are potential modus operandi for the culture
jammer. So, too, is media activism such as the cheery immolation of a mound of
television sets in front of CBS's Manhattan offices-part of a protest against
media bias staged by FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting) during the Gulf
War-and "media-wrenching" such as ACT UP's disruption of The MacNeil/
Lehrer Newshour in protest of infrequent AIDS coverage. A somewhat more con-
ventional strain of culture jamming is mediawatch projects such as Paper Tiger
Television, an independent production collective that produces segments criti-
quing the information industry; Deep Dish TV, a grassroots satellite network
that distributes free-thinking programming to public access cable channels
nationwide; and Not Channel Zero, a collective of young African-American
"camcorder activists" whose motto is "The Revolution, Televised." And then
there is academy hacking-cultural studies, conducted outside university walls,
by insurgent intellectuals.
DERY, supra, at http://www.levity.com/markdery/culturjam.html.
For example, Adbusters Media Foundation publishes a magazine, maintains a web
site, and operates the Culture Jammers Network in an effort to "topple existing power
structures and forge a major shift in the way we will live in the 21st century." Adbusters,
The Culture Jammers Network, at http://adbusters.org/information/network (last visited
June 5, 2000). Culture Jammers believe that their form of social activism
will alter the way we live and think. It will change the way information flows, the
way institutions wield power, the way TV stations are run, the way the food,
fashion, automobile, sports, music and culture industries set their agendas.
Above all, it will change the way meaning is produced in our society.
Id. However, other activists deride the jammers' guerilla art and claim that they are using
fire to fight fire in combating multinational corporations. "Beat 'em at their own game, I
guess is the thinking," wrote one critic. Carrie McLaren, Culture Jamming (tm): Brought to
you by Adbusters, STAY FRE!, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/stayfree/9/adbus-
ters.htm (last visited June 5, 2000). "But what comes out is no real alternative to our
culture of consumption. Just a different brand." Id. See generally KLEIN, supra note 17, ch.
12 (discussing culture jamming).
192. Cyberjamming simply applies culture jamming, supra note 191, to the Internet.
Adbusters, Cyberjamming with aXle, at http://www.adbusters.org/magazine/22/
axle.html (last visited June 5, 2000); Jennifer Berdock, Counter-Advertising and Its Effect
on Cyber-Media, at http://www.yorku.ca/faculty/academic/gerry/essays/berdock.html
(last visited June 5, 2000); Jam Room, Cyberjamming, at http://206.45.16.36/vmc/
swaweb/cal/Iccult3.htm (last visited June 5, 2000).
193. There were 631 arrests related to the "Battle in Seattle," mostly for obstructing
traffic, failure to move on, and other minor crimes. However, twenty-six individuals
faced felony charges for malicious mischief and burglary. Property damage is estimated
at $3 million, primarily for damaged windows and window displays and graffiti, as well
as some looting. A further $15.3 million in direct costs was incurred for public expenses
related to cleaning public spaces and overtime for the police and other personnel
involved. Seattle Police Dep't, WTO Conference Impacts, at http://www.ci.seattle.wa.us/
spd/SPDMainsite/wto/wtosconference_impacts.htm (last visited June 5, 2000).
194. Critical Mass (CM) defines itself as an "organized coincidence," not an organiza-
tion. www.criticial-mass.org, www.critical-mass.org, at http://www.critical-mass.org (vis-
ited June 5, 2000); supra note 190. CM began in San Francisco as "Commute Clot" in
1992. Chris Carlsson, Critical Mass From the Inside Out, at http://www.sflandmark.
com/cm/insideout.htm (Aug. 1993). The term "critical mass" derives from a documen-
tary film released that same year called Return of the Scorcher, Ted White, Return of the
Scorcher, at http://www.tedwhitegreenlight.com/Scorcher.htm (last visited June 5,
2000), which examined the bicycle culture and lifestyles around the world and
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Reclaim the Streets, 195 as well as more militant groups who question
whether property damage should even be considered "violence."19 6 As one
commentator noted:
Far from projecting an image of noble intentions, the protestors have
seemed to some to be more intent on wrecking McDonald's or Starbucks
outlets, venting their rage at the perceived emblems of globalized business
and subordinating private property rights to the dictates of direct action.
One group, Friends of the Earth, routinely tears up fields of experimental
genetically modified crops. Another, Greenpeace, developed the hallmark
tactic of boarding vessels at sea to advertise its protests. 197
Whether seeking to influence governmental institutions on local, national,
or international levels with traditional grassroots advocacy or bypassing
governmental institutions entirely through "street politics," the common
element among all these disparate groups is their use of the Internet to
communicate and coordinate their activities on a global scale.
described bikes waiting at intersections in China until a sufficiently large mass could
push through and force cross-traffic to wait. Carlsson, supra. Although different for each
of the several hundred cities to which it has spread, CM typically aims to conduct large
exuberant monthly gatherings of bicycle riders to "take back" the streets and public
areas in cities where the rides are held. Worldwide Critical Mass Hub, Worldwide Critical
Mass Hub, at http://criticalmasshub.com (last visited Dec. 2, 2000).
195. Reclaim the Streets (RTS) is a "disorganization" of urban environmentalists and
other activists seeking the rediscovery and liberation of the city streets. Reclaim the
Streets, On Disorganization, at http://wvw.gn.apc.org/rts/disorg.htm (last updated Apr.
18, 2000). RTS originated in London in late 1991 around the anti-roads movement, a
protest in favor of walking, cycling, and open public spaces and directed against automo-
biles and anything related to the promotion of cars. RTS protestors would suddenly over-
whelm streets and traffic with a seemingly spontaneous "street party"-complete with
music, banners, kites, and performers. As noted in RTS literature,
A carnival celebrates temporary liberation from the established order; it marks
the suspension of all hierarchy, rank, privileges, norms and prohibitions.
Crowds of people on the street seized by a sudden awareness of their power and
unification through a celebration of their own ideas and creations. It follows
then that carnivals and revolutions are not spectacles seen by other people, but
the very opposite in that they involve the active participation of the crowd itself.
Their very idea embraces all people, and the Street Party as an event has success-
fully harnessed this emotion.
Evolution of Reclaim the Streets, Do OR DIE, Summer 1997, available at http://www.
gn.apc.org/rts/evol.htm (last visited June 5, 2000). RTS groups, singly or in conjunction
with others, have conducted more than a hundred different protest events in countries
around the world, sometimes simultaneously. "The Resistance will be as transnational
as capital," declares RTS material. Reclaim the Streets, RTS Action Archive, at http://
www.gn.apc.org/rts/archive.htm (last visitedJune 5, 2000); see also KI.EIN, supra note 17,
ch. 13; Reclaim the Streets, Reclaim the Streets!, at http://www.reclaimthestreets.net (last
visited June 5, 2000).
196. E.g., Teichroeb, supra note 179, at A15; Andrew Ward, Damage to City's Reputa-
tion Feared If Protests Turn Violent, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2000, at 3.
197. Alan Cowell, Advocates Gain Ground in a Globalized Era, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 18,
2000, at C19-20.
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II. U.S. Constitutional Dimension
While "Internet advocacy" can be directed at influencing national policy,
as well as the behavior of private businesses, much of the focus to date has
been on influencing state and local governments to officially support par-
ticular campaigns. The U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council,198 however, calls into question the ongoing
utility of state and local sanctions, like the selective purchasing measures
that Simon Billenness prefers. 19 9 Accordingly, a detailed examination of
that decision's effect and reach helps in understanding the degree to which
state and local sanctions remain a viable tool and objective for these
Internet advocacy campaigns.
Many in the U.S. business community strongly object to state and
local sanctions. The National Foreign Trade Council (NFTC), which repre-
sents the majority of large U.S. exporters, 200 filed suit in 1998 challenging
the constitutionality of the Massachusetts Burma Law.2 0 1 The NFTC suit
raised basic questions regarding whether the Massachusetts law impermis-
sibly interfered with the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs
and its ability to regulate foreign commerce and whether the federal gov-
ernment's own sanctions directed at Burma preempted the state law.20 2
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared that the federal government's
sanctions did preempt the Massachusetts law.20 3 While the decision in
National Foreign Trade Council clearly curtails the ability of state and local
governments to use sanctions, it leaves a number of broader questions
unanswered.20 4 In particular, it does little to clarify how local govern-
ments' legitimate concerns regarding the responsible use of their, and their
taxpayers', monies may be accommodated when the federal government
has not preempted such actions through national policy. As a review of the
case history in National Foreign Trade Council illustrates, the constitutional
ability of local governments to use sanctions absent actual federal preemp-
tion is not entirely clear.
198. 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000).
199. Supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
200. Established in 1914, the NFTC is a non-profit organization, with a membership
of over 550 U.S. firms, that advocates free and open international trade. Most of the
largest U.S. manufacturing companies and banks are Council members. NFTC members
account for at least 70% of U.S. non-agricultural exports and 70% of U.S. private foreign
investment. USA*ENGAGE, Profile of the National Foreign Trade Council, at http://usaen-
gage.org/background/nftc.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2000).
201. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 289-90 (D. Mass.
1998), affd sub nom. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
1999), affd sub nom. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288.
202. Id. at 289. See generally David Schmahmann &James Finch, The Unconstitution-
ality of State and Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with
Burma (Myanmar), 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175 (1997).
203. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288.
204. The Court stated, "Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts with fed-
eral law is sufficient. . ., we decline ... to pass on the First Circuit's rulings addressing
the foreign affairs power or the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause." Id. at 2294 n.8
(citation omitted).
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In granting summary judgment for the NFTC, the District Court held
that the Massachusetts law impinged upon the federal government's exclu-
sive authority over foreign affairs. 205 The court cited various constitutional
provisions vesting "plenary power over foreign affairs" in the federal gov-
ernment, including Congress's authority to provide for the common
defense and to regulate commerce; 206 the President's authority as Com-
mander in Chief and power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors; 20 7
and the express prohibitions on states making treaties, entering into agree-
ments with other countries, or imposing duties on imports and exports. 20 8
According to the court, these provisions demonstrated that "one of the
main objects of the Constitution [was] to make us, as far as regarded our
foreign relations, one people, and one nation."20 9 However, the District
Court opined that the NFTC failed to establish that the federal government
had preempted state action by implication and declined to address whether
the Massachusetts statute violated the Commerce Clause.210 On appeal,
the First Circuit affirmed the determination that the Massachusetts law
impinged upon the federal government's foreign affairs powers, but also
ruled in favor of the NFTC on the preemption and Commerce Clause argu-
ments.211 Massachusetts appealed the First Circuit's decision, and the case
was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court on March 22, 2000.212
The argument regarding interference with the federal government's
general powers in foreign affairs revolved around the scope of the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Zschernig v. Miller.213 Zschernig struck down
a probate statute that essentially prohibited residents of Oregon from leav-
ing their estate to heirs in communist countries.21 4 The statute required
non-resident aliens to demonstrate that their home country granted recip-
rocal rights to U.S. citizens and that the inherited property would not be
confiscated. 215 Oregon's statutory scheme involved probate judges in a
potentially embarrassing assessment of a foreign state's "democracy quo-
tient,"2 16 subtly impairing the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. 2 17
The Court concluded that state laws that have more than an "incidental or
indirect effect" on foreign countries and that have "great potential for dis-
ruption [of] or embarrassment' in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy vio-
late powers that "the Constitution entrusts solely to the Federal
205. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 290-92.
206. Id.; e.g., U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cis. 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11.
207. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
208. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 1-3.
209. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 290 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575 (1840)).
210. Id. at 293.
211. Nat'1 Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 46-47 (1st Cir. 1999).
212. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474), 2000'WL 311140.
213. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 430-31.
216. Id. at 435.
217. Id. at 440.
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Government. '2 18 Thus, in National Foreign Trade Council, the opponents to
the Massachusetts Burma Law asserted that Zschernig held that state mea-
sures that impinge upon an exclusive federal sphere violate the Constitu-
tion, even absent any pertinent federal action.219
Massachusetts contended that selective purchasing measures are
entirely "proprietary," rather than "regulatory," and reflect the state and
local governments' decisions as the "guardian and trustee for its people" in
spending public revenues and prescribing the "conditions upon which it
will permit public work to be done on its behalf .... "220 While these
decisions may indirectly or incidentally affect foreign states, they do not
transgress the distinction between legitimate local governmental action and
the federal government's conduct of foreign affairs.221 Moreover, these
"proprietary" decisions arguably pertain to actions taken by governmental
bodies as participants in the flow of commerce, rather than as regulators.
Accordingly, the "market participation" doctrine would exempt the deci-
sions from constitutional review.222
However, while application of the market participation doctrine to the
"dormant" Commerce Clause is well recognized, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake the
Court "reserved the question whether the exception applies to the Foreign
Commerce Clause."223 If the market participation exception did apply to
the Foreign Commerce Clause, Massachusetts asserted that it similarly
should apply to the federal government's foreign affairs powers, based on
the history and structure of the clauses-"a healthy regard for federalism
and good government" that is "counseled by considerations of state sover-
eignty"224 -and the Tenth Amendment's reservation of powers to the
states. 2 25 The Supreme Court evaded these arguments by predicating its
decision on the grounds of federal preemption and declaring the Massa-
chusetts Burma law "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress."226 But interestingly, the lan-
218. Id. at 434-36. The Court reached this conclusion despite the U.S. Government's
submission of an amicus curiae brief asserting that the Oregon statute did not interfere
with U.S. foreign policy. Id. at 434, 443.
219. Id. at 441.
220. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 222-23 (1903).
221. Massachusetts noted that Zschernig did not overrule Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947), which upheld a California statue similar to Oregon's provision requiring pro-
bate reciprocity. Allen rejected a constitutional challenge to the California measure,
emphasizing the peculiarly "state" nature of succession laws and holding that an inci-
dental effect on foreign countries alone was insufficient to cross the "forbidden line."
Additionally, Massachusetts noted that Zschernig and Allen focus on the regulation of
inheritances by foreign parties, not the exercise of public spending powers. Brief for
Petitioners, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474),
2000 WL 35850, at *39 (citing Allen, 331 U.S. at 517).
222. Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 35850, at *25-*26.
223. Id. at *26 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,438 n.9 (1980)). The Reeves
Court upheld South Dakota's ability to restrict the sale of state-produced cement to
South Dakota residents.
224. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438, 441.
225. Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 35850, at *25-*26, *28-*29.
226. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
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guage associated with the Court's preemption decision relied heavily on
the federal government's need to "speak with one voice" in the foreign
affairs arena. 22
7
Massachusetts' Commerce Clause argument also focused on the mar-
ket participation exception and a state's accountability to its citizens for
the expenditure of their resources. The argument draws from a 1986 Opin-
ion of the Office of Legal Counsel that supported the constitutionality of
state and local government selective purchasing and divestiture laws
directed at the apartheid regime in South Africa.22 8 This Justice Depart-
ment Opinion endorsed application of the market participation exception
to the foreign affairs and Commerce Clause claims where a state acts in a
proprietary fashion. 22 9 The Justice Department said that the historical
record and the Reeves rationale apply equally to situations where the state
action impacts foreign commerce as when it affects domestic commerce.230
The Opinion states,
The right of a trader or manufacturer to deal with whom he chooses is
as great when his decision affects foreign as when it affects interstate com-
merce. Therefore, we believe that the rationale for the market participation
doctrine ineluctably leads to the conclusion that when a state or local gov-
ernment enters the market as a participant it is not subject to the restraints
of the Commerce Clause, whether Foreign or Interstate. 23 1
This same argument won the day in one of the few cases addressing state
and local sanctions prior to the Massachusetts Burma Law case, Board of
Trustees v. Baltimore City, where the highest court in Maryland upheld the
constitutionality of Baltimore's South African divestiture law.232
The First Circuit rejected the market participation argument in the
Massachusetts Burma case. The court considered the Office of Legal Coun-
sels Opinion that since the "states, like any corporate entity, possessed
proprietary powers at the time of the Constitution, these powers should
not be displaced unless they are prohibited by a specific limitation
imposed by the Constitution or federal legislation passed pursuant to a
constitutional grant of power to the federal government."2 33 The court
rejected that view as unsupported by the jurisprudence and contrary to the
"necessary implication" of Zschernig.2 34
Additionally, the court rejected any notion that the Tenth Amendment
would insulate state purchasing decisions from constitutional scrutiny.2 35
This assertion was not separate and distinct, according to the Court of
Appeals, from the claim that expressing the state's "moral position on an
227. Infra notes 263-74 and accompanying text.
228. 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49 (1986), 1986 WL 213238.
229. Id. at 50, 54-55.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 54-55.
232. 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
233. 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 64, 1986 WL 213238.
234. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 60 (1st Cir. 1999).
235. Id. at 60-61.
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important issue of public policy" was an important and legitimate local
government interest to be balanced against the federal government's inter-
ests under the foreign affairs power. "Even where they exist," the First Cir-
cuit stated, "strong state interests do not make an otherwise
unconstitutional law constitutional." 236 The Supreme Court considered
these arguments indirectly in its discussion of preemption.2 37
The complexity of the federal preemption question is not self-evident
from the Supreme Court's opinion. When the federal government imposed
its Burma sanctions after Massachusetts had acted, the federal government
knew similar measures existed or were under consideration in several other
jurisdictions, but it nevertheless failed to expressly address preemption. 238
In September 1996, three months after Massachusetts passed its selective
purchasing law, Congress imposed limited sanctions on Burma because of
the ongoing human rights abuses in that country.2 39
Congress directed that U.S. bilateral assistance to Burma be restricted
to humanitarian aid and certain counter-narcotics programs, 240 that the
U.S. representatives to international financial institutions vote against any
multilateral assistance to Burma,24 1 that visas be denied to Burmese gov-
ernment officials except as required by treaty,24 2 and that the President
work with other nations to develop a multilateral strategy for promoting
democracy and human rights in Burma.24 3 Congress also authorized the
President to impose further restrictions on U.S. persons establishing or
facilitating new investments in Burma if, in his determination, they proved
necessary. 2 44 President Clinton imposed these sanctions with Executive
Order No. 13,047 on May 20, 1997, eight months after Congress delegated
the authority.2 45 Thus, the federal sanctions and implementing regulations
are not co-extensive with Massachusetts' selective purchasing law.2 46
The question therefore became whether the federal scheme "occupied
the field" or took a "reasonably comprehensive approach" that invoked the
Supremacy Clause and preempted inconsistent state or local government
236. Id. at 61. Additionally, while Massachusetts did not specifically assert a First
Amendment argument, the Court of Appeals noted that "a state entity[ ] itself has no
First Amendment rights" and that even if it did, those rights would not affect the First
Circuit's reading of Zschernig. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Student Gov't Ass'n v.
Bd. of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 481 (1st Cir. 1989)).
237. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2301-02 (2000).
238. Supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
239. Federal Burma Sanctions Act, supra note 123.
240. Id. § 570(a)(1).
241. Id. § 570(a)(2).
242. Id. § 570(a)(3).
243. Id. § 570(c). The federal law also imposed certain reporting obligations on the
Executive Branch and permitted limited waivers of reporting in the interests of national
security. Id. § 570(d), (e).
244. Id. § 570(b).
245. Exec. Order No. 13,047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,301 (May 20, 1997); see also Burmese
Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 537.101-.901 (1999) (implementing the Executive
Order).
246. Compare id., with MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 7, §§ 22G-M (2000).
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action.247 Traditionally, federal preemption is not presumed, 248 as
reflected in recent decisions addressing the delicate balance between state
and federal interests. 249 However, the First Circuit reversed this presump-
tion and held that "[p]reemption will be more easily found where states
legislate in areas traditionally reserved to the federal government, and in
particular where state laws touch on foreign affairs. '250 Based on a line of
cases stemming from Hines v. Davidowitz,25 1 the Court of Appeals stated
that an "Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is
so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforce-
ment of state laws on the same subject."252 However, that analysis arguably
begs the central question: how to determine precisely when the state has
intruded upon the federal sphere?
The NFTC argued that state and local selective purchasing measures
impermissibly intrude into foreign affairs, while Massachusetts and its
supporters argued that their government procurements are intrinsically
local-a classic example of an "area traditionally occupied by the states,"
where the congressional intent to preempt must be "clear and manifest."253
Moreover, Massachusetts argued that the federal Burma sanctions must be
read against the extensive history of state and local sanctions over the last
twenty-five years, including Congress's decision not to preempt similar
measures aimed at South Africa in the 1980s;254 the Office of Legal Coun-
sel's own conclusion that federal action did not preempt state and local
South Africa sanctions; 255 the failure of previous challenges to state and
247. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
248. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 143 (1938).
249. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
250. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 73 (1st Cir. 1999).
251. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
252. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d at 74 (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
253. Id. at 73.
254. The President initially imposed sanctions on South Africa by Executive Order
12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (Sept. 10, 1985), under the authority of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA), Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 202-207, 91
Stat. 1625 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1994)). Congress
expanded these controls in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA),
Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086. The legislative history and a contemporaneous mem-
orandum prepared by Professor Laurence H. Tribe show that Congress considered and
rejected preempting the various state and local government South Africa laws. Memoran-
dum on the Nonpreemptive Effect of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986
upon State and Local Measures, 132 CONG. REc. S12534-01 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1986)
(memorandum submitted by Professor Tribe); see also Bd. of Trustees v. Baltimore City,
562 A.2d 720, 741-43 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990) (discussing the
CAAA). Interestingly, even when Congress repealed the federal sanctions on South
Africa, it refused to mandate any similar action on the part of state and local govern-
ments and rather chose to simply urge state and local governments to repeal their own
sanctions. South African Democratic Transition Support Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-
149, § 4(c)(1), 107 Stat. 1503.
255. The 1986 Office of Legal Counsel's Opinion examined and rejected the argu-
ments that Executive Order 12,532 and the IEEPA-based sanctions preempted state and
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local sanctions;2 56 and, perhaps most importantly in the State's view, Con-
gress's specific consideration of the Massachusetts Burma Law prior to
enacting federal sanctions without any express preemption provision.257
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court rejected "the argument that a
State's 'statutory scheme ... escapes pre-emption because it is an exercise
of the State's spending power rather than its regulatory power,"' 258 and
had no difficulty ruling that the federal government's Burma sanctions pre-
empted the Massachusetts law. Notwithstanding the absence of a preemp-
tion provision, the State law impinged upon the federal sanctions in several
ways. The Court stated:
[We see the state Burma law as an obstacle to the accomplishment of Con-
gress's full objectives under the federal Act. We find that the state law under-
mines the intended purpose and "natural effect" of at least three provisions
of the federal Act, that is, its delegation of effective discretion to the Presi-
dent to control economic sanctions against Burma, its limitation of sanc-
tions solely to United States persons and new investment, and its directive to
the President to proceed diplomatically in developing a comprehensive, mul-
tilateral strategy towards Burma.25 9
Even so, the Court specifically avoided deciding whether there ought
to be a presumption against preemption 2 60 and dismissed references to the
Board of Trustees v. Baltimore City case and the Office of Legal Counsel's
Opinion, noting that "[slince we never ruled on whether state and local
sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s were preempted or otherwise
invalid, arguable parallels between the two sets of federal and state Acts do
not tell us much about the validity of the latter."261 The Court recognized
that in theory there might be different types of preemption, for example, by
express provisions in federal law, by virtue of a federal scheme "occupying
the field," or to the degree that a state measure conflicts with or frustrates
the federal scheme. 2 62 Yet the Court noted that these categories are not
local government South Africa laws. 10 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 49, 64-67 (1986), 1986
WL 213238.
256. Bd. of Trustees v. Baltimore City, 562 A.2d 720.
257. Seventy-eight members of Congress supported Massachusetts's contention that
they did not intend to preempt state and local sanctions. Brief of Members of Congress
as Amici Curiae, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-
474), 2000 WL 27691, at *9, *23-*24. Numerous other members of Congress took the
opposing view and joined the NFTC in asserting that an express preemption provision
was not necessary or constitutionally required. Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Con-
gress, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (No. 99-474), 2000 WL
177173, at *26-*30. This split contributed to a lively concurring opinion by Justice
Scalia, which derided the probative value of legislative histories. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. at 2302-04 (Scalia, J., concurring).
258. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.7 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Wis. Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S.
282, 287 (1986)). In Gould, the Court struck down a state statute that was more onerous
than federal law in disqualifying repeat violators of the National Labor Relations Act
from bidding on state contracts.
259. Id. at 2294 (footnote omitted).
260. Id. at 2294 n.8.
261. Id. at 2302.
262. Id. at 2293-94.
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"rigidly distinct" and that whether a state measure becomes a "sufficient
obstacle" to federal law to trigger preemption is a matter of judgement.263
The Court also emphasized that it viewed the Massachusetts Burma law
case as an example of clear conflict with federal law, not a broader problem
of "field" preemption. "Because our conclusion that the state Act conflicts
with federal law is sufficient to affirm the judgment below," the Court
stated, "we decline to speak to field preemption as a separate issue .... ,,264
As an example of the Massachusetts law obstructing the federal Burma
sanctions scheme, the Court cited the fact that the State law penalized
those with preexisting investments or dealings in Burma and exempted
only humanitarian transactions. In contrast, the federal sanctions only pro-
hibited new investments and exempted a variety of other dealings-notably
contracts for the sale or purchase of goods, services, or technology.265 The
Court noted that "[s]anctions are drawn not only to bar what they prohibit
but to allow what they permit, and the inconsistency of sanctions here
undermines the congressional calibration of force."266
The broad, sweeping language in the opinion poses more trouble for
future state and local sanctions programs than the inconsistencies between
the respective Burma laws. The Court appears to conflate possible "field"
or "conflict" preemption with the arguments concerning the federal gov-
ernment's plenary foreign affairs powers. For example, noting the Execu-
tive's discretion in the federal Burma law, the Court pointed to its
decisions in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 267 and United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.268 regarding the President's foreign affairs
powers and stated:
Within the sphere defined by Congress.... the statute has placed the Presi-
dent in a position with as much discretion to exercise economic leverage
against Burma, with an eye toward national security, as our law will admit.
And it is just this plentitude of Executive authority that we think controls the
issue of preemption here .... It is simply implausible that Congress would
have gone to such lengths to empower the President if it had been willing to
compromise his effectiveness by deference to every provision of state statute
or local ordinance that might, if enforced, blunt the consequences of discre-
tionary Presidential action.
[T]he state Act is at odds with the President's intended authority to
speak for the United States among the world's nations in developing a "com-
prehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human
rights practices and the quality of life in Burma." . . . As with Congress's
explicit delegation to the President of power over economic sanctions, Con-
gress's express command to the President to take the initiative for the United
States among the international community invested him with the maximum
authority of the National Government .... This clear mandate and invoca-
263. Id.
264. Id. at 2294 n.8.
265. Id. at 2296-98.
266. Id. at 2298.
267. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
268. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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tion of exclusively national power belies any suggestion that Congress
intended the President's effective voice to be obscured by state or local
action.
... [T]he President's maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity
to bargain for the benefits of access to the entire national economy without
exception for enclaves fenced off willy-nilly by inconsistent political
tactics.2
6 9
Given that federal sanctions legislation, as a general rule, commonly vest
the President with broad discretion, rather than dictating specifics, 2 70 this
language is particularly striking-especially since the Court declared that
it was not dealing with federal field preemption. 27 1
The potential impact of this analysis is even more notable when com-
bined with the Court's rejection of any notion that congressional silence on
preemption implied that the President's broad discretion was confined to
matters of federal policy or that Congress approved the state and local
measures.
The State makes arguments that could be read to suggest that Congress's
objective of Presidential flexibility was limited to discretion solely over the
sanctions in the federal Act, and that Congress implicitly left control over
state sanctions to the State. We reject this cramped view of Congress's
intent .... Congress made no explicit statement of such limited objec-
tives .... We find it unlikely that Congress intended both to enable the Presi-
dent to protect national security by giving him the flexibility to suspend or
terminate federal sanctions and simultaneously to allow Massachusetts to
act at odds with the President's judgment of what national security requires.
The State's remaining argument is unavailing. It contends that the fail-
ure of Congress to preempt the state Act demonstrates implicit permis-
sion .... The State would have us conclude that Congress's continuing
failure to enact express preemption implies approval, particularly in light of
occasional instances of express preemption of state sanctions in the past.
The argument is unconvincing .... A failure to provide for preemption
expressly may reflect nothing more than the settled character of implied pre-
emption doctrine that courts will dependably apply, and in any event, the
existence of conflict cognizable under the Supremacy Clause does not
depend on express congressional recognition that federal and state law may
conflict.27
2
However, although the Court emphasized that National Foreign Trade
Council focuses on conflict preemption, its impact on state and local sanc-
tions will be more limited than some language might suggest. Even with
regard to Burma, the proponents of state and local sanctions may still pur-
sue measures that do not conflict with the congressional "calibration of
269. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. at 2295-96, 2298-99 (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
270. See Fitzgerald, supra note 9, at 11-48; Peter L. Fitzgerald, "If Property Rights Were
Treated Like Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away with This": Blacklisting and Due
Process in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HASTnNGs LJ. 73, 88-134 (1999).
271. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. at 2293-94 & n.8.
272. Id. at 2296 n.10, 2301-02 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted).
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force."273 While selective purchasing laws and the associated blacklists
may no longer be the "tactic of choice" for advocacy groups after this deci-
sion,274 other tools such as disclosure provisions and divestment measures
remain an option for state and local governments. Also, the ability of pri-
vate parties to mount boycotts or organize shareholder resolution cam-
paigns, as in the Pepsi campaign, remains unaffected.27'
Ultimately, absent direct conflicts or inconsistencies with federal law,
the constitutionality of state and local sanctions may depend on whether
the Court characterizes the particular provision as within the scope of
traditional local actions-proprietary in nature-such as government pro-
curement, or whether it is viewed as a "foreign policy" measure-aimed at
affecting another nation's actions. Characterizing state and local sanctions
as "foreign policy" measures, as occurred in National Foreign Trade Council,
leaves them in a more exposed position than if they were characterized
otherwise. But this balance is the essence of federalism, achieving the cor-
rect allocation and balance of governmental authority within a system of
potentially overlapping responsibilities. As Justice Hugo Black wrote, feder-
alism involves:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continu-
ance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States
and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their
separate ways.27 6
This description, in turn, reflects basic notions of representation in
our republican form of government. As outlined in the Federalist Papers,
various "factions" are represented in government, and:2 77
[tihe regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal
task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of party and faction in the
necessary and ordinary operations of the government.
The federal Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the
great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and
particular to the State legislatures. 278
In a time of rapidly increasing globalization and the democratizing
force of the Internet, the ability of "factions" or advocacy groups to effec-
tively represent their positions at all levels of government is particularly
interesting. This power potentially blurs the distinction between the "great
273. Supra note 266 and accompanying text.
274. Supra note 156 and accompanying text.
275. Supra notes 96-171 and accompanying text.
276. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
277. Factions are defined in the Federalist Papers as "a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE FEDERALisT No. 10 (James
Madison).
278. Id.
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and aggregate" and the "local and particular" interest. In the coming
months, the Free Burma Coalition will bring their organizing skills to bear,
reemphasizing divestment measures on the state and local level and possi-
bly building upon the sympathy of the seventy-eight members of Congress
who supported Massachusetts's use of sanctions279 to seek new legislation
authorizing local selective purchasing measures. The National Foreign Trade
Council decision established significant boundaries on the use of state and
local sanctions measures, at least where federal preemption clearly occurs,
but it does not preclude such sanctions altogether.
III. International Legal Dimension
Entirely apart from the constitutional issues these measures create, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United States'
membership in the World Trade Organization pose a number of interre-
lated problems for proponents of state and local sanctions. The GATT-
WTO system of trade agreements are predicated on four basic pillars,280
consisting of basic "most favored nation"281 and "national treatment"28 2
obligations implemented through a series of "binding tariff conces-
sions"28 3 and ongoing efforts to eliminate direct or indirect "quantitative
restrictions" 284 on trade. Taken together, these principles promote a global,
nondiscriminatory trading system. The relationship of these rules to local
government sanctions and to the issues at the heart of many of the recent
Internet advocacy campaigns is complex and not always self-evident.
GATT generally requires that governments refrain from discriminating
among goods or suppliers from different countries under the "most favored
nation" principle and from discriminating between local and foreign goods
or suppliers under the "national treatment" principle. These obligations are
not unique to the GATT; Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties
and their more recent counterpart, the Bilateral Investment Treaty, com-
monly include most favored nation and national treatment clauses.285
However, especially when conducting their own purchasing activities, gov-
ernments frequently want to discriminate for a number of reasons. For
example, since governments typically raise funds through local taxes, they
naturally desire to spend those funds locally. Governments are reluctant to
extend "national" treatment to "foreign" goods or suppliers in their pro-
curement activities. Accordingly, a special exception for government
procurements was inserted into the national treatment provisions of the
279. Supra note 257.
280. RAj BIALA & KEVIN KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAw 59 (1998).
281. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. 1, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
282. Id. art. III; see also General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment], Annex IB, art. XVII, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESuLTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33
I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
283. GATT art. II.
284. Id. art. XI.
285. BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 280, at 90.
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original 1947 GATT Agreement.2 8 6
Yet, concerns developed regarding the potential for abuse of this excep-
tion, especially since government procurement typically accounts for ten to
fifteen percent of a country's gross domestic product.2 87 Particularly troub-
lesome are those situations where governments or government-controlled
entities do not confine their purchases to traditional "governmental" pur-
poses or activities, but rather compete with ordinary commercial enter-
prises in the marketplace. These concerns resulted in the 1979 Agreement
on Government Procurement2 8 8 negotiated during the Tokyo Round of
trade negotiations, 28 9 which failed to gain widespread acceptance, 290 and
in the 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Government Procurement
(GPA). 2 9 1 The "plurilateral" Uruguay Round Agreement replaced the Tokyo
Round Agreement2 9 2 and strives to bring government purchasing activities
within the scope of the basic GATT obligations.2 93
In line with the other GATT-WTO agreements, the GPA obligates con-
tracting parties2 94 to establish minimum procedural and substantive rights
in their national laws and regulations.29 5 A key obligation is to follow the
basic GATT "national treatment" and nondiscrimination principles. 296
286. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Sept. 14, 1948, T.I.A.S. 1890, 62
U.N.T.S. 80 (creating GATT art. III, 1 8(a)); see also GATS art. XIII.
287. WTO, Overview of the Agreement on Government Procurement, at http://
wv.wto.org/wto/english/tratop-e/gproc e/overe.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2000).
288. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 12, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th
Supp.) at 33 (1980) (entered into forceJan. 1, 1981), amended by Protocol Amending the
Agreement on Government Procurement, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 12 (1988).
289. The "Tokyo Round" was conducted between 1974 and 1979 as the seventh of the
eight GATT "rounds" of trade negotiations conducted since 1947. BHALA & KENNEDY,
supra note 280, at 5-6.
290. As late as the beginning of 1994, only twelve nations had signed the Tokyo
Round Government Procurement Code. Id. at 7.
291. Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement,
Annex 4(b), http://wvw.wto.org/English/docs-e/legaLe/gpr-94.pdf [hereinafter GPA].
292. Unlike the patchwork system of agreements and "codes" with different signato-
ries under the old GATT regime, the WTO was envisioned as a single undertaking. That
is, the WTO Agreement created a single framework that pulled together the GATT, a
series of Understandings amending the GATT, and a variety of new Multilateral Trade
Agreements and binds all WTO members equally. The legacy of the a la carte approach
remains, however, in the so-called "plurilateral" agreements on government procure-
ment, dairy products, and bovine meat found in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement. These
agreements represent updated versions of Tokyo Round agreements, binding only those
WTO members that have specifically accepted them, and create no rights or obligations
for other WTO members. BtALA & KENNEDY, supra note 280, at 12-15.
293. The GPA significantly expanded the scope of the government purchasing activity
included within the GATT regime. The WTO estimates that the GPA covers ten times the
activity covered under the older Tokyo Round agreement, addressing roughly $300 bil-
lion in government procurement worldwide. WTO, supra note 287, at http://www.
wto.org/wto/english/tratop-e/gproce/over-e.htm.
294. The United States and twenty-five other states, along with the European Union,
are members of the GPA. Another eighteen states and three international organizations
have "observer" status. WTO, Committee on Government Procurement, at http://
wvww.vto.org/wto/english/tratop-e/gproc..e/memobs._e.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2000).
295. GPA art. I.
296. Id. art. III.
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Covered governments must give foreign suppliers, goods, and services "no
less favourable" treatment than given domestically and must not discrimi-
nate among foreign suppliers, goods, or services.297 Moreover, the GPA
prohibits covered governments from discriminating among domestic sup-
pliers on the basis of foreign ownership or the provision of foreign goods or
services. 298
The GPA elaborates on these key obligations with a series of detailed
provisions focused on providing greater transparency in the government
bidding process; 299 encouraging nondiscriminatory300 competitive bid-
ding30 1 based on technical specifications 30 2 and contract awards based on
the lowest evaluated bid;303 and providing appropriate information, publi-
cation,30 4 and dispute resolution procedures for the disappointed bid-
ders30 5 and the signatories to the agreement. 30 6 The GPA provides
exceptions, however, for general import requirements not specifically
related to government procurement activities, such as import duties;30 7
297. Id. art. III(1).
298. Id. art. 111(2).
299. Id. arts. VII-XVII (providing extensive detail on how a government procurement
process should be handled).
300. Id. art. VII(I).
301. Id. arts. VII-XIV (describing the competitive bid process), XV (describing the
circumstances when "limited tendering" or noncompetitive procurements are appropri-
ate), XVI (prohibiting generally the use of "offsets" in evaluating who receives a govern-
ment contract award). "Offsets... are measures used to encourage local development or
improve the balance-of-payments accounts by means of domestic content, licensing of
technology, investment requirements, counter-trade or similar requirements." Id. art.
XVI(1) n.7.
302. Performance-based technical specifications must be used in government
procurements without regard to particular producers or products and must be based on
international or other technical standards, whenever possible, to avoid "creating unnec-
essary obstacles to international trade." Id. art. VI(1).
303. Id. art. XIII(4)(b).
Unless in the public interest an entity decides not to issue the contract, the
entity shall make the award to the tenderer who has been determined to be fully
capable of undertaking the contract and whose tender, whether for domestic
products or services, or products or services of other Parties, is either the lowest
tender or the tender which in terms of the specific evaluation criteria set forth in
the notices or tender documentation is determined to be the most advantageous.
Id.
304. Id. arts. VII(2), IX, XVIII, XIX.
305. The GPA's extensive bid challenge procedures are unique within the GATT-WTO
system of agreements. The GPA mandates that each signatory state enact a challenge
procedure, including a right of recourse to an impartial and independent review body or
a right to judicial review by a court with the authority to correct any deficiencies in the
procurement process through both interim and permanent measures. Id. art. XX.
306. In addition to the bid challenge process for disappointed bidders, the GPA pro-
vides for consultations and invocation of the general WTO Dispute Settlement Under-
standing in any disagreements between the signatories. Id. art. XXII. However, remedies
such as retaliation against another party by withdrawing WTO "concessions" or benefits
are limited to matters covered by the GPA, reflecting the GPA's status as one of the few
"plurilateral" WTO agreements. E.g., id. art. XXII(3), (5), (6).
307. Id. art. 111(3).
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requirements to promote public morals, safety, or health;30 8 measures
necessitated by national security or national defense;30 9 and special treat-
ment for developing countries.3 10 Moreover, the GPA only applies to those
procurements above a certain amount31 1 made by "central" and "subcen-
tral" government entities specified in annexes to the Agreement.31 2
The United States domestically implemented its obligations under the
GPA with the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, and the GPA accordingly
entered into force for the United States on January 1, 1996.313 Addition-
ally, Annex 2 listed thirty-seven states covered by the GPA, including Mas-
sachusetts.31 4 The exact coverage within each state varies. In some
instances, the GPA covers all procurements conducted by the state; in
others, the GPA only covers procurements by particular agencies. 31 5 How-
ever, where states receive federal monies, for example on a mass transit or
highway project, they may be required to comply with the federal statutory
requirements that incorporate the GPA. Additionally, in a bilateral memo-
randum of understanding between the United States and the European
Union, two additional states committed to providing nondiscriminatory
treatment of suppliers, goods, and services from Europe in their procure-
308. The GPA permits measures taken to "protect public morals, order or safety,
human, animal or plant life or health or intellectual property; or relating to the products
or services of handicapped persons, of philanthropic institutions or of prison labour,"
but restricts their application "in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination... or a disguised restriction on international trade." Id.
art. XXIII(2).
309. Unlike the other GPA exceptions to the basic obligations, the national defense
exception is entirely unrestricted and "self-judging." Id. art. XXIII(1).
310. Id. art. V.
311. Id. art. 1(4) ("This agreement applies to any procurement contract of a value of
not less than the relevant threshold specified in Appendix I."). Each party specifies its
own thresholds, which are subdivided into different appendices depending on whether a
"central," "subcentral," or "other" governmental entity is involved. Infra note 312 and
accompanying text. For the United States, the procurement thresholds for goods and
services are 130,000 special drawing rights, or SDRs, ($186,000) for "central" govern-
ment entities; 355,000 SDRs ($507,000) for "subcentral" government entities; and
400,000 SDRs ($571,000) for other government entities. WTO Comm. on Gov't Procure-
ment, The Thresholds in Appendix I of the Agreement as Expressed in National Curriencies
for 1998/1999; Addendum, United States, GPA/W/66/Add.5 (July 15, 1998), available at
http://wvv.wto.org/wto/govt/thresnat.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2000).
312. The parties' declarations in Appendix I refine the GPA's coverage. Appendix I is
broken down into five separate annexes. Annex I contains the list of covered central
government entities. Annex 2 contains the list of covered subcentral government entities.
Annex 3 contains all other covered entities. Annexes 4 and 5 specify certain services
that are within or without the GPA's scope. GPA art. I(1) n.1.
313. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.).
314. The states applying the GPA are: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyo-
ming. GPA app. I, (United States), Annex 2, reprinted in 1 LAv & PAcTcIE OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 157 (Joseph F. Dennin et al. eds., 2000).
315. Id.
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ments.316 Similar agreements with Norway and Switzerland expanded non-
discriminatory treatment at the subcentral government level. 317
Based on these obligations, the European Union318 and Japan319
invoked the state-to-state dispute resolution process under Article XXII of
the GPA to challenge the United States over the Massachusetts Burma Law.
Since Massachusetts was a covered subcentral government in the GPA
Appendix, the European Union asserted that the restrictions imposed by
the state's Burma Law violated several provisions of the Agreement. In par-
ticular, the EU claimed that preventing Massachusetts public authorities
from contracting with businesses, foreign or domestic, that do business
with Burma contravenes the Article III national treatment and nondiscrimi-
nation principles; the Article VIII(b) obligation to limit conditions on bid-
ding to those that ensure the firm's ability to perform the contract; the
Article X obligation to qualify bidders on fair and nondiscriminatory eco-
nomic, rather than political, criteria; and the Article XIII obligation to
award contracts to the lowest bidder on the basis of economic, rather than
political, factors.320 The EU also argued that the Massachusetts restrictions
nullified or impaired the GPA's benefits by limiting access to subcentral
government procurements so as to "result in a de facto reduction of the US
sub-federal offer" under Article XXII(2) of the Agreement.321 After consul-
tations failed to resolve the matter, a Dispute Settlement Panel was
appointed to handle the combined cases.322 However, the challenges were
suspended 323 and eventually lapsed 324 after the U.S. courts' rulings that
the Massachusetts Burma Law was unconstitutional.325
Interestingly, both the NFTC and Massachusetts argued before the
U.S. Supreme Court that the World Trade Organization complaint sup-
316. Those states are North Dakota and West Virginia. WTO Trade Policy Review
Body, Trade Policy Review: United States-Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR/S/56 277
(June 1, 1999).
317. Id.
318. WTO, United States - Measure Affecting Government Procurement: Request for
Consultations by the European Communities, WT/DS88/1, GPA/D2/1 (June 26, 1997).
319. WTO, United States - Measure Affecting Government Procurement: Request to Join
Consultations: Communication from Japan, WT/DS88/2 (July 2, 1997).
320. WTO, United States - Measure Affecting Government Procurement: Request for
Establishment of a Panel by the European Communities, WT/DS88/3 (Sept. 9, 1998).
321. Id.
322. WTO, United States - Measure Affecting Government Procurement: Constitution of
the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities and Japan, WT/DS88/4,
WT/DS95/4 (Jan. 11, 1999).
323. WTO, United States - Measure Affecting Government Procurement: Communication
from the Chairman of the Panel, WT/DS88/5, WT/DS95/5 (Feb. 12, 1999).
324. WTO, United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement: Lapse of Author-
ityfor Establishment of the Panel: Note by the Secretariat, WT/DS88/6, WT/DS95/6 (Feb.
14, 2000).
325. Supra Part II. The EU noted that permitting the WTO case to lapse did not reflect
a lessened concern about the effects of the Massachusetts Burma Law, merely the fact
that the law was not currently in effect; new proceedings would be instituted should the
law become effective in the future. Brief for the European Communities and their Mem-
ber States as Amici Curiae, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288
(2000) (No. 99-474), 2000 WL 177175, at *7.
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ported their respective positions. The European Union filed an amicus
brief supporting the National Foreign Trade Council's challenge to the Mas-
sachusetts law.326 As would be expected after their WTO complaint, the
EU expressed concern "that state and local laws such as the Massachusetts
Burma Law interfere with the normal conduct of international relations
and raise questions about the ability of the United States to honor its inter-
national commitments."327
The EU noted that its concerns extended beyond the specifics of the
Massachusetts law, however, to encompass the proliferation of state and
local government sanctions generally and the use of extraterritorial secon-
dary boycotting irrespective of whether applied at the federal or local gov-
ernment level.3 28 In addition to the twenty-two local jurisdictions that
passed Burma laws, the EU pointed to forty state and local government
amicus briefs supporting Massachusetts as underscoring the potential for
"even greater proliferation" of these measures in the future. 329 Moreover, it
noted:
At least eleven U.S. states and municipalities have enacted measures pur-
porting to regulate business activities in Nigeria, Tibet, Indonesia, Switzer-
land, Northern Ireland, or Cuba, and at least 18 state and local governments
have considered or are considering similar measures restricting business ties
to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, North Korea, Iraq,
Morocco, Laos, Vietnam, or China.
Thus while-as discussed above-the Massachusetts Burma Law stand-
ing alone certainly presents difficulties in the conduct of EU-U.S. relations,
the EU's concern is much broader than simply the disruption caused by this
particular law. State and local sanctions, and any proliferation therof,
greatly increase the difficulty of the U.S. Government to speak consistently
and with one voice on maters of foreign affairs, thus exacerbating tensions
in EU-U.S. relations. 330
The use of extraterritorial secondary boycotts, affecting third parties
beyond the direct political targets of these foreign policy measures, is
another historical point of contention. The EU noted that prior to the
injunction against the Massachusetts law, the restricted purchasing list
included not only 53 foreign companies with Massachusetts affiliates but
also 228 foreign companies with no connection to the state.331 Many of
these companies had European connections. Thus, European businesses,
which may not even have had any business with Massachusetts, received
unsolicited questionnaires seeking detailed information concerning their
possible dealings in Burma. Massachusetts required regular updates to the
information and used the information to compile the restricted purchase
326. Brief for the European Communities and their Member States as Amici Curiae,
2000 WL 177175.
327. Id. at *2.
328. Id.
329. Id. at *9.
330. Id. at *9-*10.
331. Id. at *8 n.9.
Cornell International Law Journal
list.3 32 Since Massachusetts published this blacklist on the Internet and
other governments used similarly restrictive laws for dealings with Burma,
the EU expressed concern about the "chilling effect" the blacklist would
have on doing business with the United States or elsewhere. 333
The EU has had similar disputes with the United States regarding the
various U.S. economic sanctions employed at the federal level.
33 4
The United States and the European Union have expended considerable
effort seeking to resolve their differences over U.S. extraterritorial economic
sanctions, This effort has not yielded progress on the issue of extraterritorial
sanctions imposed by state and local governments, a shortcoming that is of
considerable concern to the EU. In recognition of this danger of prolifera-
tion of sanctions measures, the EU and the U.S. agreed at the EU-U.S. Sum-
mit on May 18, 1998 on a set of principles covering the future use of
sanctions in the context of the Transatlantic Partnership on Political Cooper-
ation. This included agreeing that the EU and the U.S. "will not seek or pro-
pose, and will resist, the passage of new economic sanctions legislation
based on foreign policy grounds which is designed to make economic opera-
tors of the other behave in a manner similar to that required of its own eco-
nomic operators" and that such sanctions will be targeted "directly and
specifically against those responsible for the problem." Crucially, it was also
agreed that it is in the interests of both the EU and the U.S. "that the policies
of governmental bodies at other levels should be consonant with these prin-
ciples and avoid sending conflicting messages to countries engaged in unac-
ceptable behavior."33 5
The EU thus asserted that the proliferation of state and local sanctions
undermines and contradicts these objectives.
While the NFTC pointed to the EU complaint as a demonstration of
the problems caused when state and local government impermissibly
impinge upon the exclusive national authority over foreign affairs,3 3 6 Mas-
sachusetts tried to use the same facts against the NFTC. Massachusetts
argued that beyond Congress's failure to specifically preempt state and
local Burma laws, it implicitly approved of state and local government
selective purchasing laws by specifically precluding a private right of
action against any state law on the basis of the GATT in the Uruguay
Round Agreements Act.3 37 Massachusetts asserted that rather than permit-
ting private enforcement actions, Congress required that challenges to state
laws alleging noncompliance with the U.S. government's obligations under
GATT must be brought by the United States itself,33 8 which it did not do in
332. Id. at *8.
333. Id.
334. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 9.
335. Brief for the European Communities and their Member States as Amici Curiae,
2000 WL 177175, at *10 (footnote omitted).
336. E.g., Respondent's Brief, 2000 WL 193325, at *29, *32.
337. Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 35850, at *19-*21, *43-*46; Reply Brief for Peti-
tioners, 2000 WL 272027, at *19-*21; see 19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) (1999).
338. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(1).
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this case.33 9
This argument borrowed from Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board34 ° the notion that Congress knows how to preempt state law when it
chooses to do so.3 4 1 Moreover, Massachusetts argued:
Barclays rejected reliance on the "disapproval" of "many of our trading part-
ners" for good reason: on the stage of international politics, the drama never
ceases, and each season is full of conflicts, conspiracies, protests, and
threats. None of these perennials, however, should influence a United States
court to nullify the democratic action of the citizens of a State.
34 2
Noting the proliferation of modern international trade agreements and the
breadth of their coverage, Massachusetts argued that permitting the courts,
by implication, to entertain a plethora of claims under these international
agreements would "sap the lawmaking powers of the States."343 The State
advocated that courts should "reject this role and instead defer to the pow-
ers of Congress 'to reduce to a minimum the frictions that are unavoidable
in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters touching their dignity and
interests." 3 44
Despite Massachusetts's creative reasoning that striking selective
purchasing laws would vitiate a range of local measures addressing issues
ranging from the environment to fair labor laws,34 5 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument out of hand.
The State [argues] that we should ignore the evidence of the WTO dispute
because under the federal law implementing the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT), Congress foreclosed suits by private persons and for-
eign governments challenging a state law on the basis of GATT in federal or
state courts, allowing only the National Government to raise such a chal-
lenge.... But the terms of § 102 of the [Uruguay Round Agreements Act]
and of the [Executive Branch Statement of Administrative Action] simply
does not support this argument. They refer to challenges to state law based
on inconsistency with any of the "Uruguay Round Agreements." The chal-
lenge here [in National Foreign Trade Council] is based on the federal Burma
law. We reject the State's argument that the National Government's deci-
sions to bar such WTO suits and to decline to bring its own suit against the
339. Massachusetts also noted that the President's Statement of Administrative Action
regarding implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which Congress
approved, 19 U.S.C. § 3511(a), 3512(d), showed that the preclusion of private claims
extended to constitutional challenges, such as those predicated on the Commerce
Clause. Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 35850, at *20.
340. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
341. Barclays upheld California's worldwide "unitary" tax on multinational corpora-
tions based on "implicit permission" from Congress when it failed to nullify the tax,
notwithstanding opposition to the tax expressed by the Executive Branch and numerous
foreign countries. Id. at 320-31.
342. Brief for Petitioners, 2000 WL 35850, at *44 (citing Barclays, 512 U.S. at 320,
324 n.22).
343. Id. at *46.
344. Id. (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44,57 (1958), overruled on other grounds
by Afroyim v. Rusk 387 U.S. 253 (1967)).
345. Brief of Nonprofit Organizations as Amid Curiae, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474), 2000 WL 35838, at *21-*30.
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Massachusetts Burma law evince its approval. These actions simply do not
speak to the preemptive effect of the federal sanctions against Burma. 3 46
In fact, the Court pointed to the Executive Branch's frustration with
the WTO complaints as further evidence of the "obstacles" the Massachu-
setts law created to achieving the objectives of the federal sanctions. The
Court quoted statements by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
and Business Affairs, Alan P. Larson:
"[T]he EU's opposition to the Massachusetts law has meant that U.S. govern-
ment high level discussions with EU officials often have focused not on what
to do about Burma, but on what to do about the Massachusetts Burma law."
[T]he state law "has hindered our ability to speak with one voice on the
grave human rights situation in Burma, become a significant irritant in our
relations with the EU and impeded our efforts to build a strong multilateral
coalition on Burma where we, Massachusetts and the EU share a common
goal."34 7
IV. Movement Toward A New International Federalism
Sharing and allocating authority across different levels of government,
whether or not in pursuit of a common goal in a particular case as pro-
fessed by Assistant Secretary Larson, is at the core of the traditional notion
of "federalism."348 While National Foreign Trade Council reflects classic fed-
eralism-addressing where governmental authority lies within the U.S.
political system-it also exemplifies a new and emerging trend in federal-
ism writ large. The Court decided the narrow issue of whether U.S. federal
law preempted the Massachusetts' Burma law, but the case also left unan-
swered questions regarding how authority should be allocated among
diverse political and governmental systems in an era of globalization. What
is the role of national, state, and local governments in the world market-
place? To what degree can local government action reflect the concerns
raised in the streets and on the Internet regarding labor, environment,
trade, and a host of other issues regulated by international institutions and
agreements?
In a federal system of representative republican government, 34 9 the
346. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. at 2301 n.24 (citation omitted).
347. Id. at 2300 & n.21 (citing Alan P. Larson, State and Local Sanctions: Remarks to
the Council of State Governments (Dec. 8, 1998)).
348. THe FEDERALIST No. 10 Games Madison).
349. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison declared that only a republican form of
government "would be reconcilable with the genius of the people of America; with the
fundamental principles of the Revolution; or with that honorable determination which
animates every votary of freedom to rest all our political experiments on the capacity of
mankind for self-government." He defined the criteria for a republican form of
government:
If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on which different forms
of government are established, we may define a republic to be, or at least may
bestow that name on, a government which derives all its powers directly or indi-
rectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
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actions taken by various local governments form part of an ongoing dia-
logue with the national government because local and national government
are both "agents and trustees of the people, [simply] constituted with dif-
ferent powers, and designed for different purposes." 3 50 By interacting
within their respective spheres, the state and national governments refine
what is in the "great and aggregate" national interest or the "local and par-
ticular" interest, a distinction that the Framers of the Constitution believed
helped to minimize the pernicious influence of "factions" and promote the
common good.3 5 1
The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their partic-
ular States but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the
other States.... A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an
equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will
be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular mem-
ber of it, in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a
particular county or district than an entire State.
... ITiherefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most
incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure
and pride we feel in being republicans ought to be our zeal in cherishing the
spirit and supporting the character of federalists.3 52
The increasing globalization of commerce and communications fueled
by technologies like the Internet does not alter the fundamental need to
distinguish between local and larger interests, but it does add another
dimension. Globalization expands the dialogue to include new participants
in defining the "great and aggregate" interest. International institutions,
such as the WTO and the IMF, and supranational bodies, such as the EU,
that traditionally interacted with the national representatives of member
nations are now being drawn into a more direct dialogue with local and
other governments.
The Massachusetts Burma Law, for example, prompted direct discus-
sions between European and WTO officials and the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, as well as the U.S. government. 353 While these discussions
their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is
essential to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the
society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise
a handful of tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of
their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans and claim for their govern-
ment the honorable title of republic. It is sufficient for such a government that
the persons administering it be appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the
people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just speci-
fied; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other
popular government that has been or can be well organized or well executed,
would be degraded from the republican character.
THE FeDERa.IsT No. 39 (James Madison).
350. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison).
351. THE FEDERALIST No. 10; see also supra notes 276-79 and accompanying text.
352. THE FEDERALIST No. 10.
353. Brief for the European Communities and their Member States as Amici Curiae,
Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474), 2000 WL
177175, at *5.
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became problematic once the federal government determined that the
nation should "speak with one voice" with regard to trade sanctions on
Burma, National Foreign Trade Council does not foreclose the more general
dialogue engendered by state and local government action, absent actual
preemption. Yet, the appropriate scope and form for local government par-
ticipation in this wider international dialogue remains to be determined.
The answer may not actually lie in the formal legal structure of the relation-
ships between international institutions, national governments, and local
governments, but rather in the political sphere and the question of how
"factions," or advocacy groups like the Free Burma Coalition, influence the
international institutions that affect trade.
The confluence of issues raised by the Massachusetts Burma Law
case, and the broader protests surrounding globalization, may lead to a
new and enduring political sensitivity; one that gives human rights advo-
cates, environmentalists, unionists, and others a platform for concerns
ignored by bureaucrats and elected officials. To counter the image of "shel-
tered elites" operating behind dosed doors, those promoting global trade
will need to better explain their programs and more directly engage those
who have particular concerns to be addressed. As President Clinton
observed in Seattle, "If the WTO expects to have public support grow for
our endeavors, the public must see and hear and, in a very real sense actu-
ally join in the deliberations."354 In practical terms, the dynamics of the
relationship between international institutions and individuals nominally
represented by their member national governments is already changing-in
large part due to the impact of Internet-based communications and
advocacy.
To borrow from the terminology of business management and the
study of corporate governance, 355 the public and the advocacy groups are
"stakeholders" in the institutions regulating international trade-parties
who are affected by or who can affect an organization's behavior.35 6 While
354. Lacayo, supra note 4, at 34.
355. Although corporate governance theory is most often associated with analyzing
the relationship and responsibility of the firm to its providers of capital funding,
[clorporate governance also implicates how the various constituencies that
define the business enterprise serve, and are served by, the corporation. Implicit
and explicit relationships between the corporation and its employees, creditors,
suppliers, customers, host communities-and relationships among these constit-
uencies themselves-fall within the ambit of a relevant definition of corporate
governance. As such, the phrase calls into scrutiny not only the definition of the
corporate form, but also its purposes and its accountability to each of the rele-
vant constituencies.
Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contempo-
rary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAw & Cor nmP. PROBS. 9, 11
(1999).
356. Stakeholder analysis has proven useful in analyzing how organizations, such as
public corporations, address the concerns of different constituencies, which frequently
are contradictory or in competition with one another. Stakeholder analysis attempts to
explain how organizations decide which of the competing views will take precedence by
examining and categorizing the relationships, interests, and impact of each stakeholder
group. E.g., Max B.E. Clarkson, A Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating
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nations are the primary actors in international institutions such as the
WTO and the IMF and the general public and advocacy groups are tradi-
tionally represented only through their national governments, the Internet
has begun to modify these relationships.35 7 Phrased in more classic inter-
national law terms, this situation exemplifies how individuals, not just
states, can be both the "subjects" and "objects" of international economic
law.35 8
As an example, Internet-based technology empowered what otherwise
might have been a marginal campaign for the Free Burma Coalition. Using
e-mail, the web, and related technologies, the Coalition was freed from any
dependency on traditional media to communicate information about the
conditions in Burma and to disseminate its positions.35 9 Technology ena-
bled the Coalition to network with like-minded activists as well as monitor
its opponents' actions.360 Also, technology augmented the urgency and
impact of the Coalition's campaign by coordinating an effort to combine
consumer boycotts, shareholder action, and legislative lobbying.361 The
aggregation of numerous activist groups pursuing their diverse interests
with similar tactics 3 62 has increased awareness of the importance of these
"secondary stakeholders" to the perceived legitimacy of the major interna-
tional trade institutions.363 Consequently, the WTO and the IMF have
sought to address themselves directly to the constituencies that member
nations represent.
The WTO Director-General, Mike Moore, initially took the lead in
responding to the concerns over globalization brought to the fore by the
Seattle demonstrators. Even as the protestors were gathering, he initiated a
series of steps aimed at better educating the general public about the role
and operation of the WTO and making the operation of the WTO more
transparent. Beginning -with a strong speech to the nongovernmental orga-
Corporate Social Performance, 20 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 92 (1995); Ronald K. Mitchell et al.,
Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who
and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 853 (1997).
357. Stakeholder analysis distinguishes between "primary" stakeholders with a direct
interest in the organization, such as a corporation's shareholders, employees, or custom-
ers, and "secondary" stakeholders with a less direct influence on the organization, such
as the corporation's competitors, activists, or the media. Clarkson, supra note 356, at
106-07.
358. Stemming from Jeremy Bentham's An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, first published in 1789, nineteenth-century legal positivists asserted that
only sovereign states were proper "subjects" of international law and that individuals
were merely "objects" of international rules. This distinction contributed to lively theo-
retical debates that still persist, despite the decline of positivism, as international human
rights law, economic law, criminal law, and conflicts of law rules continue to evolve.
E.g., MARK W. JANIs, AN INTRODucTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAWv 227-40 (2d ed. 1993).
359. Supra notes 99-157 and accompanying text.
360. Supra notes 93-171 and accompanying text.
361. Supra notes 93-171 and accompanying text.
362. Supra notes 172-97 and accompanying text.
363. This result, however, also depends upon the perceived legitimacy of the activists'
complaints. If the Internet merely promotes an annoying cacophony, the same commu-
nications method that empowers the advocacy groups can undermine their impact.
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nizations assembled at the opening of the Seattle Ministerial Conference,
Moore hit several concerns head on:
A decade and a half ago the Uruguay Round was launched in the face of
public apathy. No one can say that about Seattle .... We have gone from
apathy to anxiety and even anger, not just from the demonstrators in the
streets, but from people around the world who feel that for too long they
have been locked out of the benefits of growth, and from those who fear for
their security in a time of uncertainty and change.
... [LIet's be clear about what the WTO does not do. The WTO is not a
world government, a global policeman, or an agent for corporate interests. It
has no authority to tell countries what trade policies - or any other policies -
they should adopt. It does not overrule national laws. It does not force coun-
tries to kill turtles or lower wages or employ children in factories. Put simply
the WTO is not a supranational government - and no one has any intention
of making it one.
Our decisions must be made by our Member States, agreements ratified
by Parliaments and every two years Ministers meet to supervise our work.
There's a bit of a contradiction with people outside saying we are not demo-
cratic, when inside over 120 Ministers all elected by the people or appointed
by elected Presidents, decide what we will do.
The real question we should ask ourselves is whether globalization is
best left unfettered - dominated by the strongest and most powerful, the rule
of the jungle - or managed by an agreed system of international rules, rati-
fied by sovereign governments.
36 4
At a separate meeting in Seattle with legislators and parliamentarians
from member countries, Director-General Moore further emphasized the
importance of the inter-governmental dialogue to the WTO's operations:
I get deeply offended when people say the WTO is not democratic....
The WTO is member driven, thus driven by Governments, Congresses
and Parliaments. Every two years our Ministers meet to give us guidance.
Our agreements must be agreed and ratified by members and Parliaments.
Some of those who protest miss these fundamental steps by which we
operate. We operate from and by consensus. Any nation can and does block
progress ....
... We in the WTO are member driven, rules driven. Our member states
direct our progress. And that's how it should be.
... [W]e and the other institutions in the global architecture were cre-
ated to be owned by the people via their Governments. 36 5
364. WTO, The WTO Is Not a World Government and No One Has Any Intention of
Making It One, Moore Tells NGOs, PRESS/155 (Nov. 29, 1999) (transcribing speech by
WTO Director-General Mike Moore), available at http://www.wto.org/ddf/ep/D5/
D5158e.doc (last visited June 25, 2000).
365. WTO, Moore Cites Role of Legislators in WTO, PRESS/159 (Dec. 2, 1999) (tran-
scribing speech by WTO Director-General Mike Moore), available at http://
www.wto.org/ddf/ep/D5/D5250e.doc (last visited June 25, 2000).
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Director-General Moore then repeated these sentiments in a statement
before the European Parliament, using language that harkened back to
James Madison's arguments in the Federalist Papers:
Our agreements must be agreed by governments and ratified by Parlia-
ments. We all need to be more accountable. Parliaments and Congresses sus-
tain governments. Public opinion sustains governments. Elected
representatives are the main expression of civil society. Their support is
measured, they are accountable, they need to be more involved. This is a real
way in which we can counter some of the anxieties about globalization and
public alienation. Elected representatives have a responsibility to become
more involved, hold hearings, scrutinise where the taxpayer's money is going
and ensure that the great international institutions created to manage global
affairs have the moral authority that comes from the ownership and partici-
pation of Member governments.
How to ensure that people feel ownership in a real sense is the chal-
lenge of those who cherish the democratic principle and have a vision of a
world managed by rules not force, agreements not power. How the represent-
atives of the people face this challenge will be a key factor in providing a
more peaceful, stable world. To do this the international institutions must be
more open and accountable .... 366
Thus, while emphasizing that the WTO is a representative organization
where the delegates from member governments set and approve its agenda,
Moore simultaneously tried to encourage greater discussion of globaliza-
tion among other government officials, legislators, and even nongovern-
mental organizations and advocacy groups.
Recognizing that Internet-based tools can work both ways, the WTO
reflected this outreach effort in a series of changes to its web site. Realizing
that users from over 171 countries visited the WTO web site during the
Seattle meeting-a rate 160% greater than the comparable period the prior
year, the WTO revised its online image to promote "transparency and make
it easier for the public to obtain correct information about the WTO."3 6 7
The express purpose for these changes, which began with the "trade and
environment" section-an area of concern to many Seattle protestors-"is
to make the website more easily accessible to a public with little knowledge
of WTO subjects, Agreements or activities, while at the same time contain-
ing sufficiently detailed information to meet the needs of users from WTO
Member Governments, other intergovernmental organizations and more
specialized members of the public."3 68 Other web-based tools added to
address the concerns Director-General Moore identified include the series
of web pages created-in multiple languages-to correct the ten most com-
366. WTO, Moore Calls for Closer Parliamentary Involvement in WTO Matters, PRESS/
169 (Feb. 21, 2000) (quoting WTO Director-General Mike Moore), available at http://
www.wto.org/ddf/ep/E6/E645e.doc (last visited June 25, 2000).
367. WTO Comm. on Trade & the Env't, Improving the Trade and Environment Pages of
the WTO Website, WT/CTE/W/131 (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://www.wto.org/ddf/
ep/E4/E413e.doc (last visited June 25, 2000).
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mon misunderstandings about the WTO. 369
None of these efforts are required for the WTO's immediate opera-
tions or to deal with the delegates from member countries. It is extremely
useful, however, in continuing the ongoing discussion with the public and
the constituencies represented by its member nations, in support of the
WTO mission as determined by those member governments. As the
recently out-going Chairman of the WTO General Council, Ali Mchumo,
commented with regard to
the broader concern of how best to manage the world trading system in the
light of the present configuration of its membership ..., Seattle has provided
a wake up call for all of us to reflect and re-examine how we need to evolve a
more inclusive and participatory system of decision making even when con-
sensus remains the basic principle of decision making. Indeed, the institu-
tional reforms that need to be made to the multilateral trading system is one
of the major concerns that will be addressed in the consultations that we
have agreed to undertake in the immediate future. 370
The IMF responded in a similar fashion, although less aggressively, to
the protests surrounding its spring meeting in Washington, D.C. in April
2000. It noted that the World Bank and IMF policies were becoming the
object of "a growing public debate" that had to be considered. 371 Earlier in
the year, the retiring Managing Director of the IMF criticized the world
community for not reforming international financial institutions more rap-
idly. Michel Camdessus declared, "We are in a dangerous period of twilight
between when the principles [for reform] are agreed upon and when they
are acted upon at the local level." 372 Just days before the Washington pro-
tests, at a conference entitled Prompting Dialogue: Global Challenges and
Global Institutions, the IMF Acting-Managing Director, Stanley Fischer,
warned that "we should not dismiss the concerns of those who feel
threatened by globalization. We must ensure that the process is managed
properly, and... [ask] what the international institutions - the Fund in
particular - need to do to help ensure that happens."373 Fischer stated:
369. WTO, 10 Common Misunderstandings About The WTO, at http://www.wto.org/
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E500e.doc (last visited June 25, 2000).
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Ironically, an anti-globalization protestor splattered a pie in Camdessus's face shortly
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has inflicted" on the world's poorer nations. Id.
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The Fund is now deeply engaged in a process of ongoing reform. We are
making ourselves more transparent....
... [Tihe spring meetings give our 182 member countries the opportu-
nity to say how they think we are doing and to tell us what they think we
should be doing next. These meetings, together with the role of the Executive
Board, are an essential element in the process by which we are held account-
able to our shareholders.
We look forward to hearing what our shareholders, the governments
that own us, will tell us, and how they will instruct us, as we move
forward.37 4
While primarily concerned with the opinions of its member govern-
ments, the IMF, like the WTO, also used its web site to help explain its role
and mission more fully to the general public. In addition to the usual web
pages describing the role and function of the organization,375 just prior to
the April meetings, the IMF staff posted sizable "issue briefs" on globaliza-
tion,376 the environment,377 and the basic reforms being considered for
the Fund.378
These public relations efforts did little to quell the anti-globalization
campaign being fueled on the Internet. Thirty thousand people took to the
streets of Washington to protest the actions of the IMF and the World Bank,
institutions which were previously even less well known than the WTO.379
While the Washington protests were generally less disruptive to the organi-
zations' meetings than those in Seattle, the protestors were reportedly
pleased with their ability to parade the "Bretton Woods Twins" before the
media as institutions contributing to the problems of third world
poverty.380
The chain of protests against international institutions and policies
continued with smaller demonstrations at the 33rd Annual Meeting of the
Asian Development Bank in Thailand in May and the Asia-Pacific Summit
of the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, Australia in September.38' At
the IMF's annual meeting in Prague later in September, however, the next
significant demonstrations occurred. Over ten thousand protestors from
around Europe seriously disrupted the meeting, and their actions effec-
tively dominated the agenda and resulted in the early cancellation of the
program.382 Czech President Vaclav Havel even orchestrated a highly pub-
licized, but largely unproductive, meeting at the Prague Castle among the
374. Id.
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heads of the IMF, World Bank, and the "Civil Society" protestors. 383 Then,
in December, several thousand people again engaged in several days of vio-
lent protests at the European Union summit meeting in Nice, France. Ironi-
cally, at the same time the EU was considering how to operate in a more
representative fashion as it expands its membership.38 4
The Internet played a crucial role in fueling and coordinating each of
these protests, establishing an ongoing chain of events at which the anti-
globalization concerns are raised and reiterated. 38 5 Internet advocacy was
also a key factor in making debt relief for the developing world a priority at
both the IMF and the World Bank, as well as influencing congressional
support for U.S. participation in the international global debt relief propos-
als. 38 6 Thus, while international institutions and agreements may some-
times constrain national and local government action, advocacy groups are
increasingly adept at using the Internet-and direct action-to voice their
concerns at the international level as well.
Conclusion
Any federal system must maintain a balance. Many of the organizations
that took to the streets to criticize international institutions for their lack of
accountability are themselves unaccountable to any constituency. "What
we saw in Seattle is the rise of a new kind of politics. Disparate groups,
organized through the Internet and other easy means of communication,
pursue at the supranational level what they cannot accomplish at the
national level."387 As one commentator noted:
[L]inked by the Internet and a sense of shared objectives, [these] organiza-
tions are building networks of influence as the representatives of what they
term the "civil society," acting essentially as self-appointed watchdogs on
dubious ... behavior.
In using the term "civil society" to denote their purported following
[these] organizations, as some see it, are assuming a mandate that has not
been granted by any democratic or representative process of
accountability.38 8
While more openness and cooperation among all levels of government in
formulating rules of international trade are laudable, as Madison indicated
in the Federalist Papers,389 narrow interest groups-lacking mainstream
support-should not be permitted to entirely bypass democratic govern-
mental processes, which depend upon the support of broad majorities.
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Local governmental action provides one means of facilitating or main-
taining a balance between democratic processes and social concerns, as
illustrated by the use of state and local measures like the Massachusetts
Burma Law and the divestment measures advocated by Simon Billenness.
Rather than protectionism clothed as progressivism, these measures reflect
a degree of "vetting" because their passage requires more than a modicum
of local support, and they can help inform the larger debate in a classic
federal manner. Moreover, on widely varying issues, from genetically modi-
fied food to human rights for example, it is sometimes difficult to deter-
mine which level of government should control-whether the issue deals
with the "great and aggregate" interest or a purely local matter. Thus, the
local input that these subcentral government measures provide should be
encouraged, not discouraged.
In fact, there is great irony in this process. Part of the theory behind
free trade is that commerce brings nations closer together. The activists
who use the Internet to express their opposition to traditional mercantil-
ism, multinational corporations, and globalization are in many respects as
international as Pepsi or any other multinational corporation. However,
they proffer a vision of globalization based on social activism, not com-
merce. If we recognize that "[d]ifficult issues that aren't easily handled by
the normal institutions of governance - whether local or global - sometimes
require new forums in which to appeal to conscience and to reach consen-
sus,"3 90 encouraging this emerging international "federal" dialogue will
facilitate solutions that can be supported at all levels.
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